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ARTICLES 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS? EU INTERNET PRIVACY AND THE 
POST ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM 
Mark F. Kightlinger-
This Article provides a timely examination of the European 
Union's approach to information privacy on the internet, an 
approach that some legal scholars have held up as a model for law 
reform in the United States. Building on the author's recent piece 
discussing the Us. approach to internet privacy, this Article 
applies to the EU's internet privacy regime a theoretical 
framework constructedfrom the writings of philosopher and social 
theorist Alasdair MacIntyre on the failures of Enlightenment and 
post-Enlightenment thought. The EU internet privacy regime is 
shown to reflect and reinforce three key elements of the "post-
Enlightenment paradigm," i.e., the sovereign individual, the 
market, and the administrative bureaucracy. The EU regime, like 
the Us. internet privacy regime, stems from and helps to preserve 
a world in which the individual constructs a personal identity by 
trading personal information as a commodity to corporate 
bureaucracies in a regulated market under the supervision of 
impersonal government bureaucracies. In what Macintyre labels 
"the culture of bureaucratic individualism, " each new assertion of 
the individual's supposed fundamental right to privacy 
paradoxically enhances bureaucratic power. Because in these 
fundamental respects the EU internet privacy regime resembles 
the us. regime, the Article contends that debate over which 
regime is superior is little 'more than a family quarrel, a quarrel 
that cannot be resolved under the post-Enlightenment paradigm. 
This Article identifies and discusses important new questions 
about the extent to which our post-Enlightenment situation 
constrains our capacity to imagine and act upon innovative 
approaches to personal privacy. 
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2004; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988; Ph.D., Yale University, 1991; B.A./M.A., Cambridge University, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a constant flow of news stories reporting the lack 
of privacy safeguards for personally identifiable information (PII}-i.e., information 
about identified or identifiable persons --collected through electronic networks such 
as the Internet and held in electronic databases. I As a consequence, the U.S. legal 
regime for protecting such PII has encountered criticism from privacy advocates and 
scholars.2 In a leading casebook on e-commerce law, for example, Professors Mann 
and Winn describe the "apparent consensus" within the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on "the importance of information privacy 
and ... of taking all appropriate steps to increase individual privacy rights.") In 
contrast to this consensus, they underscore the "sharp divisions within the U.S. 
debate on information privacy and the tortured progress of information-privacy law 
I On March 14,2007, a search via http://news.google.comdetected 158 news stories containing the 
terms "Internet," "privacy," and "violation" posted between February 12 and March 14,2007. There is no 
reason to bel ieve that this represents an unusual number of stories for a one-month period. 
2 For examples of such criticism, see Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998), and Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 V AND. 
L. REV. 1609 (1999). 
3 RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 209 (2d ed. 2005). 
2007] TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS? 3 
refonn in the United States.'''' Critics often point to the legal regime of the European 
Union (EU), which adopted comprehensive privacy legislation in 1995 and special 
privacy legislation for electronic communications in 2002,5 as a model for law 
refonn in the United States.6 Not surprisingly, this line of argument emphasizes the 
differences between the U.S. and EU regimes while providing legal scholars with a 
flattering opportunity to kibitz participants in the legislative process. This Article 
adopts a different strategy, highlighting features that the U.S. and EU privacy' 
regimes have in common and explaining the significance of these common features. 
In a recent article/ I showed that the U.S. internet privacy regime reflects and 
reinforces what I have tenned the post-Enlightenment paradigm for explaining and 
justifYing human action and social institutions. The post-Enlightenment paradigm 
emerged after the disintegration of a widely shared ancient and medieval approach to 
questions about human nature and ethical conduct and the subsequent failure of 
Enlightenment thinkers and their successors to provide a persuasive alternative.s 
Drawing extensively on the work of Alasdair Macintyre, I argued that the post-
Enlightenment paradigm relies on three elements-the individual, the market, and 
the bureaucracy-and their interconnections to explain and justifY our actions and 
social institutions, and I demonstrated that these elements provide the structure for 
the U.S. internet privacy regime. The primary objective of this Article is to establish 
that the EU regime also is constructed around these three elements. Because both 
regimes reflect and reinforce the post-Enlightenment paradigm, a second objective of 
this Article is to show that disagreement over the relative merits of the two regimes 
is in fact a family feud.9 My third objective is to show that such disagreement is 
itself a reflection of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, which channels political 
debate into a running battle over whether and to what extent we should expand 
bureaucratic power in order to limit the freedom of individuals in the market. The 
U.S. internet privacy regime emphasizes individual freedom, the EU regime 
bureaucratic power, and together they mark out and define the political alternatives 
that we normally have available to us. 
Typically, a work of legal scholarship would proceed from this comparative 
discussion to a "nonnative" argument that one of the two internet privacy regimes, 
U.S. or EU, or a hybrid of them is preferable. For reasons that will become clear, \0 
the post-Enlightenment paradigm commits us to the position that any such nonnative 
argument favoring one particular regime will stem from arbitrary, even if strongly 
held, premises and therefore draw arbitrary, even if logically sound, conclusions. 
One could of course purport to reject the post-Enlightenment paradigm and build a 
new or different intellectual foundation for a regime to protect privacy online. But 
doing so would require one to accomplish the philosophical task at which all 
, Id. 
S For a detailed discussion of the EU regime, see infra Part Ill. 
6 See infra notes 302-306 and accompanying text. 
7 Mark F. Kightlinger, The Gathering TWilight? Information Privacy on the Internet in the Post-
Enlightenment Era, 24 J. MARSHALL 1. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353 (2007). 
8 See infra Part II (summarizing earlier discussion of the post-Enlightenment paradigm). 
9 See infra Part V. 
III See infra pp. 58-59. 
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Enlightenment and pre-Enlightenment thinkers have by hypothesis failed, i.e., 
constructing a philosophical position that provides adequate reasons for embracing a 
list of moral and ethical precepts by which each of us should live. That Promethean 
undertaking is beyond the scope of this Article. \I Instead, this Article pursues the 
more modest objective of showing that some important features of our intimate lives, 
including the personal relationships that to a considerable extent define who we are, 
elude the grasp of the post-Enlightenment paradigm's conceptual apparatus. Thus, 
the Article provides grounds for concluding that we may need an alternative 
paradigm that does not rely on the individual, the market, and the bureaucracy to 
explain and justifY our actions and our institutions, but the Article does not attempt 
to supply such a paradigm. 
This Article is the second step in a larger project to develop a heuristic and 
critical framework for investigating and appraising the historical and philosophical 
assumptions underlying certain modem legal and administrative arrangements. My 
decision to build the framework on the work of Alasdair Macintyre is based on a 
conviction that legal scholarship has never adequately addressed or incorporated his 
insights into the origins of modernity. One might, therefore, say that this Article is 
my second experiment in "applied Macintyre," testing the hypothesis that we can 
learn a great deal about the EU internet privacy regime and about ourselves as 
potential subjects of it by focusing on various issues and concerns that I have drawn 
from Macintyre's work in articulating the post-Enlightenment paradigm. I reserve 
for a later date any effort to criticize Macintyre's position. Instead, this Article 
focuses, as did the earlier article about the U.S. regime, on building a prima facie 
case for paying greater attention to Macintyre's views in future discussions of our 
legal and administrative situation. 
The argument of this Article proceeds in four stages. Part II summarizes the 
results of my previous study outlining the post-Enlightenment paradigm and 
showing the extent to which the U.S. internet privacy regime reflects and reinforces 
it. Part III describes the far more complex EU internet privacy regime, focusing on 
the central position of administrative bureaucracy and the relatively limited role of 
individual consent. Part IV shows that the EU regime reflects and reinforces the 
post-Enlightenment paradigm. Through careful examination of a field that is 
excluded from the EU regime's scope, i.e., collection and use of PII in our "purely 
personal" lives, Part IV also investigates certain important limitations of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. Part V argues that the alleged choice between the U.S. and 
EU regimes is itself a reflection of the paradigm, and that under the paradigm any 
choice between the two regimes ultimately will be arbitrary. 
II See infra pp. 60-62 (briefly describing the type of argument necessary to transcend the post-
Enlightenment paradigm). 
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS?
I1. THE POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM AND THE U.S. INTERNET
PRIVACY REGIME
Drawing on the work of Alasdair Maclntyre, 12 I argued in a recent article 13 that
the internet privacy regime developed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
the United States reflects and reinforces the post-Enlightenment paradigm 4 for
explaining and justifying human action. The post-Enlightenment paradigm emerged
after a much older tradition of reflection on ethical conduct collapsed and such
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophers as Denis Diderot, David Hume,
Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill failed to
develop a persuasive replacement.'" The older tradition, founded by Plato and
Aristotle and sustained by later thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, explained and
justified human action using a three-part teleological framework: an account of
human beings as they happen to be here and now, an account of the end or telos of
human life, i.e., the human good, and an account of the precepts mandating certain
virtues and forbidding certain vices that enable human beings to make the transition
from the former to the latter. 16 Within this older tradition, ethics as a field of inquiry
taught us how to understand and reflect upon our lives as they are here and now and
at the same time provided us with guidance on how to achieve our potential, our
good, as human beings. 17 The older tradition viewed human beings as essentially
social: we embody in our lives a series of interconnected roles and relationships,
each with associated precepts about virtues and vices, in and through which we
develop our characters and work to realize the human telos.'8 At the broadest level
of organization, we can become citizens of a "community united in a shared vision
of the good for man (as prior to and independent of any summing of individual
interests)."' 9
The older Aristotelian tradition began to crumble in the face of criticisms of
teleological explanation by Reformation theologians and the emerging community of
natural scientists and natural philosophers.20 According to Maclntyre, a key effect of
such criticisms was to undermine the then-existing accounts of the human telos,
12 See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY 226 (1990) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, THREE
RIVAL VERSIONS]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, FIRST PRINCIPLES, FINAL ENDS AND CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (1990); and ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS (1999).
13 See Kightlinger, supra note 7.
14 The term "paradigm" is borrowed from the work of Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51, 174-191 (2d ed. 1970). See also THOMAS S. KUHN,
Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 293, 297, 318-319 (1977). For a discussion
of Kuhn's use of the term, see Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 355 n. 9.
"5 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 357.
16 See id.
'7 See id.
" See id. Thus, I might be a son today and a father tomorrow, a student today and a teacher
tomorrow. To achieve my good, I would move from being a good son to a good father, a good student to
a good teacher. In practicing the characteristic virtues of son, father, teacher and student, I would be
contributing to the good of the relationships and organizations in which I participate.
'9 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 236.
20 Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 358 n. 17.
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thereby replacing the three-part teleological framework with a two-part framework
consisting of an account of human beings as they are here and now and one or more
lists of precepts about ethical conduct that human beings should follow.
2'
Enlightenment thinkers and their successors tried to provide a persuasive explanation
of how these two elements of the framework might be rationally connected. Their
efforts inevitably failed, however, because precepts that were intended to change and
improve human beings as they are here and now simply could not be derived from
any plausible account of how human beings actually are here and now.22 As
Enlightenment thinkers and their immediate successors struggled with this problem,
it seemed increasingly obvious that there was an unbridgeable gap between the "is"
of how human beings are here and now and the "ought" of how human beings
should behave. Eventually, the "is" comes to be seen as the realm of "fact," which is
objectively available for study by the natural and social sciences, while the "ought"
comes to be seen as the realm of "value," which is private, subjective and not open
to rational dispute.23 The supposed gap between "is" and "ought," "fact" and
"value," lies at the heart of the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
The post-Enlightenment paradigm for explaining and justifying human action
has three essential elements. First, it seeks to account for human beings by treating
them as individuals, 24 unlike the older teleological tradition, which treated people as
instances or embodiments of human nature and as occupants of interlocking social
roles and relationships.25  As individuals, human beings may consent to play
particular roles and adopt particular values, but there is no higher standard such as
the human lelos, no shared vision of the good, against which these individual
decisions might be measured. Each individual has his or her own private values, and
society is the arena in which each individual pursues those values in cooperation or
conflict with other individuals. The model for such a society is the market, which is
the second essential element of the post-Enlightenment paradigm.26 We learn to see
our social interactions as a form of market behavior in which we each pursue our
individual values and the market distributes whatever we want to each of us for a
price.
The challenge for any framework that attempts to explain and justify human
action in terms of individuals pursuing individual values is that it appears destined to
result in a world of conflict and, perhaps, chaos. The classical description of this can
be found in Thomas Hobbes's charter myth of the "warre ... of every man, against
every man., 27 Adding the institution of the market to explain and justify individual
interactions may account for the absence of conflict when individuals can reach
mutually acceptable bargains, but there remains a need for a third element, an
institution that can channel and coordinate individual activity, and thereby reduce, if
not eliminate, the possibility of conflict and chaos when bargaining does not produce
21 See id. at 357.
22 See id. at 357-58.
23 See id. at 359"0.
24 See id. at 360-61.
25 See id. at 357-58.
26 See id. at 360-61.
27 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64 (Dent 1965) (1651).
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acceptable results. Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, bureaucracy provides
the neutral, impersonal institution that channels and coordinates individual behavior
toward pre-defined ends.28 The bureaucracy performs this function in both business
organizations and public administration. But bureaucracies do not claim to apply an
objectively true standard such as a shared vision of the good to their ends because in
our post-Enlightenment era such a standard is not available. In that sense, the ends
that bureaucracies pursue are as arbitrary, subjective, and non-rational as the
individual values those bureaucracies seek to channel and coordinate.2 9
Bureaucracies do, however, maintain order, by force if necessary, and that is their
function under the paradigm.
Maclntyre characterizes the symbiotic relationship between individual and
bureaucracy as the "culture of bureaucratic individualism.,,30  He observes that in
this culture--our culture-political debate typically focuses on the merits of
extending bureaucratic control.3 Some advocate less bureaucracy and greater
individual freedom to pursue individual values. Others explicitly or implicitly
advocate more bureaucracy in order to "limit the free and arbitrary choices of
individuals.' 32  Political disputants are thus two sides of the same post-
Enlightenment coin operating within the same framework but deploying conflicting
and typically irreconcilable values to reach conflicting and contradictory
conclusions.
The U.S. internet privacy regime reflects and reinforces the three essential
elements of the post-Enlightenment paradigm. As fashioned by the FTC, the U.S.
regime treats the privacy of P11 as a question of individual interest and concern.
33
Each adult individual is presumed to have the ability, and thus is given the authority,
to determine whether the level of protection for P11 offered by a particular website is
sufficient. The U.S. regime requires the website to provide whatever protection
might have been promised, but the regime does not purport to question whether the
level itself was sufficient.34 That decision is left to each individual.
The U.S. regime incorporates the second element of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, i.e., the market, by presuming the existence of a market for PII, then
identifying and purporting to correct a market malfunction that may arise from
overly aggressive competitive behavior.35 Specifically, the FTC treats the statements
that website operators make about how they protect the privacy of P11 as a form of
28 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 361-62. For a discussion of how the term "bureaucracy" is
being used here, see id. at 402-03, and infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
29 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 361-62.
'o MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 71.
31 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 362.
32 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 35. Of course, those who advocate limiting
freedom may speak of the need to ensure that individual behavior obeys certain rules, but in practice, this
typically means that the bureaucracy's authority as the enforcer of the rules will expand, As the authors
of one casebook have written, administrative agencies "are necessary if government is to do anything."
JOHN M. ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I (2003).
13 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 394-99.
'4 For a description of how the U.S. regime operates, see id. at 367-76.
'3 See id. at 383-89.
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advertising that is potentially false and/or misleading to internet users.36 The FTC
then penalizes website operators whose collection and/or use of PHI fails to abide by
the operators' public statements about privacy protection.37 The presumption is that
each individual will be able to agree to a market price for his or her PHI provided he
or she receives accurate information about how the PH1 will be collected and used.
PH1 is understood to be a commodity that can be valued in relation to other
commodities.5 Thus, paradoxically, in response to concerns that PlH does not
receive sufficient privacy protection on the internet, the FTC developed a legal
regime designed to guarantee that PH1 can circulate in a properly functioning market
for the right price, i.e., the price at which an adult individual who has received
accurate information might agree to sell. In this respect, the U.S. regime betrays a
fundamental ambivalence about the privacy of P11, extolling the value of PII but
ensuring that it is for sale.39
The central role of the bureaucracy--the third essential element of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm-in the U.S. internet privacy regime is implicit in what
already has been said about the first two elements. The assumption that the value to
be assigned to the privacy of P1H is what each individual says it is leads to a
multiplicity of possible values. Corporate bureaucracies succeed in reducing this
multiplicity to a small range of possible values by offering to trade for PII at a price
that serves the corporation's interests.4 ° Company officials who establish the price
structure at, for example, Amazon.com exercise significant influence over the value
that the market will assign to the privacy of PII, thereby channeling and coordinating
individual values into a relatively small range of market prices. But the threat that
individuals and/or business organizations run by bureaucracies may engage in overly
aggressive market behavior creates a need for another bureaucracy the task of which
is to administer the rules of trade governing the market, including the key rule that
website operators must abide by their public statements concerning Pll.
Accordingly, FTC officials play a necessary channeling and coordinating role as
impersonal experts who apply a supposedly neutral system of rules to maintain order
in the market. 4' Thus, it appears that under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, an
individual's personal information can receive the privacy protection that the
individual's private values may demand only if impersonal public officials supervise
the markets where individuals disseminate their PHI for a price. In this respect,
therefore, the U.S. internet privacy regime reflects and reinforces the culture of
bureaucratic individualism that, according to Maclntyre, pervades our modern, post-
Enlightenment situation.
The next three parts of this Article show that the EU internet privacy regime
represents a further step along the continuum of political debate under the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. Part Ill outlines the EU regime, focusing on the limited
36 See id. at 367-68.
37 see id.
38 See id. at 384-85.
39 For a discussion of the ambivalence of the U.S. regime toward PHI and privacy, see id at 399-
402.
40 See id. at 403-05.
"' See id. at 405-07.
[Vol. 14
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS?
role of individual consent and the central role of public officials under EU privacy
law. Part IV shows the extent to which the post-Enlightenment paradigm provides
the conceptual framework for the EU regime. Part V demonstrates that debate over
the relative merits of the EU and U.S. internet privacy regimes will inevitably be a
family feud because the two regimes and the contrasts between them are rooted in
the culture of bureaucratic individualism and the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Ill. THE EU INTERNET PRIVACY REGIME
The EU regime for protecting the privacy of PHl on the internet consists
primarily of two laws, the Data Protection Directive ("DP Directive" or
"Directive") 42 and the Electronic Communications Data Protection ("ECDP")
Directive.43 The DP Directive, which was adopted in 1995, establishes uniform
information privacy rules across all sectors of the economy and, with some notable
exceptions, all fields of government activity-a so-called "horizontal" regime. 4 All
EU Member States45 are required to have laws on their books implementing the
46Directive.
The ink was barely dry on the DP Directive when European officials concluded
that special rules were required to address certain data-protection issues that, in their
view, had begun to arise in connection with new telephone technologies such as
integrated services digital networks and digital mobile telephony. Consequently, in
1997 the European Community 47 (EC) adopted the Telecommunications Data
Protection ("TDP") Directive, which established privacy rules for the
42 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter DP Directive]. For a general discussion of the DP
Directive and its background, see Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Lav and Restrictions on
International Data Floivs, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995), and Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis:
The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REv. 445 (1995).
13 Council Directive 2002/58, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter ECDP
Directive].
4 See DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 3.2 (noting the fields of government activity to which the
Directive "shall not apply" and thereby implying that it will apply to all other fields).
'5 When the DP Directive was adopted, there were fifteen EU Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Ten countries joined the EU on May 1, 2004: Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Two more countries - Bulgaria and Romania -joined on January 1, 2007. For a short official history of
the EU's growth, see Europa, The EU at a Glance - The History of the European Union,
http://europa.eu/abcihistory/index-en.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
'6 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 32. 1. The European Commission maintains a website that
reports on the implementation status of the Directive in each Member State. See Data Protection, Status
of Implementation of Directive 95/46, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation en.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
17 The European Community ("EC") is a subordinate component of the European Union ("EU").
The EU encompasses what are commonly referred to as three "pillars": (I) the European Communities
(i.e., the EC, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom), (2) the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
and (3) Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. For a brief discussion of the three pillars, see Koen
Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 746, 751 (1998). The EC has developed the most elaborate body of law, usually termed "EC
law" or "Community law."
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telecommunications sector.48 Ironically, the TDP Directive reached the end of the
legislative process at roughly the time that the internet began to emerge as a medium
of communication and commerce for consumers within the EU. Not surprisingly,
the TDP Directive's language, which was directed at telephony, fit internet
technology poorly.49 Thus, when European officials embarked on an effort in 2000
to update laws related to electronic communications, they proposed to revise the
TDP Directive to address internet issues. Following this revision process, the EC
replaced the TDP Directive with the ECDP Directive in 2002.
Since the ECDP Directive was written to cover the internet, it would seem
natural to focus on that law in this Article. That approach would be misguided,
however, because most issues that may arise between internet users and website
operators are likely to arise not under the narrowly targeted ECDP Directive, but
under the horizontal DP Directive. Thus, this Article focuses on the latter. The
Article briefly discusses the ECDP Directive in order to show how it supplements
the DP Directive.5 °
A. Overview of Data Protection Directive
The DP Directive imposes a range of obligations on "data controllers," i.e., the
people within an organization who determine the purposes and means for processing
personal data. 5' This Article focuses on website operators who collect and use
personal data and who therefore are data controllers under the Directive.52 The
phrase "personal data" covers all "information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person," or "data subject. 53 Member State officials charged with enforcing
the Directive tend to interpret the concept of "personal data" expansively. In the
internet context, for example, a bare IP address 54 in the hands of a website operator
48 Council Directive 97/66, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC) [hereinafter TDP Directive].
49 For example, under the TDP Directive, network operators generally were required to erase or
make anonymous "traffic" data generated in the course of connecting "calls." TDP Directive, supra note
48, art. 6. 1. In the Internet context, it makes little sense to refer to the communication between an
individual and a website as a "call" and thus it was unclear whether and to what extent the TDP
Directive's restrictions on traffic data applied to websites. For a more detailed discussion of this issue,
see Mark F. Kightlinger et al., International Privacy, in E-COMMERCE LAW & BUSINESS 10-08 to 10-00
(Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., 2003).
'0 See infra Part D.
5' DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(d). The Directive's requirements apply to all persons or
organizations that may collect and use an individual's P11, with one exception. The Directive does not
apply to processing of personal data "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity." Id. art. 3.2. The Directive also does not cover data collection and use related to "public
security, defence, State security.., and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law." Id. art. 3.2.
See infra, note 88, for a short discussion of the Directive's national defense and security loopholes.
52 Although the Article focuses on the obligations that the Directive imposes on website operators, it
should not be misunderstood to imply that these obligations relate exclusively or specifically to website
operators. The obligations apply generally to all individuals and entities that are, or wish to become, data
controllers.
53 Id. art. 2(a). In order to avoid over-reliance on the Directive's technical jargon, this Article uses
the term "PII" as a synonym for "personal data."
54 "[Aln IP address identifies a computer connected to the Interet with a unique.., number made
up of 12 digits divided into four groups of numbers separated by decimals -e.g., 121.122.123.124."
MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 756.
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may be considered personal data on the theory that "someone, somewhere can
connect the IP address to an individual internet user., 55 The Directive also defines
the term "processing" broadly to cover essentially any operation that a data
controller might perform on Pil from collection through deletion.56
Under the Directive, each EU Member State must establish a data protection
supervisory authority (DPSA) "responsible for monitoring the application within its
territory of the provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this
Directive." 7 The Directive says little about the composition of the DPSAs except
that they must be "public authorities," i.e., administrative agencies.58 The Directive
appears to presume that the DPSA will consist of "members and staff,"59 suggesting
a bureaucratic structure comprising a manager or management group such as a board
or commission overseeing the work of subordinate officials. The DPSAs "shall act
with complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them. ''6° They
should not, in other words, be subject to external political or administrative control.
Member State law must give the DPSA power to investigate, including "access to
data forming the subject-matter of processing operations."6' Thus, P11 is not
protected from, or private with respect to, the DPSA. Member States must ensure,
however, that the members and staff of the DPSA are "subject to a duty of
professional secrecy with regard to confidential information to which they have
access. ' 62  In addition, the DPSA can opine on data protection policy, bring
administrative proceedings against data controllers, and take data controllers to court
for alleged violations of applicable laws.63 The DPSA must have the power to
"order[] the blocking, erasure or destruction of data, [and] ... impos[e] a temporary
or definitive ban on processing.'6 4  Administrative decisions by supervisory
authorities may be appealed to national courts.65
The DP Directive establishes a Working Party on the Protection of Individuals
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (DPSA Working Party) comprising a
representative of each DPSA, a representative from any EC-level data protection
authority, and a representative of the European Commission.66 The Directive gives
the DPSA Working Party a range of responsibilities. For purposes of this Article,
the most important is to "examine any question covering the application of the
national measures adopted under this Directive in order to contribute to the uniform
. Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-25 (footnote omitted).
6 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(b). This Article refers to "collection and use" of PII rather
than "processing of personal data," but these phrases are intended to be synonymous.
" Id. art. 28.1.
58 Id.
'9 Id. art. 28.7.
60 Id. art. 28.1.
61 Id. art. 28.3.
62 Id. art. 28.7. It is not clear whether the phrase "confidential information" is intended to cover all
of the P1i to which the DPSA might have access or only a portion of the PHI that is deemed "confidential."
61 Id. art. 28.3.
64 id.
65 id.
66 Id. arts. 29.1, 29.2. For information about the composition of the DPSA Working Party, see
Justice and Home Affairs, Data Protection - Working Party - Members,
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/membersen.htm.
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application of such measures. ' 67  In carrying out this responsibility, the DPSA
Working Party has adopted more than one hundred papers interpreting the Directive
and discussing its application to various privacy issues.68 Although the legal status
of these papers is not clear, they do provide valuable guidance to anyone interested
in finding out how the DPSAs interpret the Directive and intend to enforce its
terms.
69
As discussed in the following parts, under the DP Directive, a person's informed
consent is often unnecessary and never sufficient to legitimate collection and use of
P11. Informed consent is often unnecessary because in a variety of circumstances, a
website operator is not required to obtain a person's consent before collecting and
using the person's P11. Instead, the website operator must meet the requirements and
expectations of the relevant DPSA. Consent is never enough because a website
operator must fulfill a number of obligations before, during, and after collecting and
using PIH that are independent of the consent of any person whose PlH the controller
may collect. Those obligations facilitate oversight by the DPSA that enforces them.
Indeed, it is only a slight overstatement to say that the primary purpose of the
Directive is to subject collection and use of PH1 to comprehensive administrative
oversight while providing space for informed consent where it appears that
individuals can be trusted with decisions concerning the handling of their own P11.
This arrangement may be contrasted with that in the United States, where the
primary purpose of the bureaucracy in the field of privacy protection is to facilitate
and establish the conditions for individual consent. What the two systems have in
common is that they are both forms of bureaucratic individualism, as one would
expect under the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
B. Consent Often Is Unnecessary
Under the DP Directive, a data controller is allowed to collect and use PIH only
if the controller can identify a legitimate basis for doing so. 70 Consent is one such
basis. A website operator who wishes to collect and use an individual's PII may rely
on an individual's consent in three situations. A website operator may seek-but is
not required to seek-consent when collecting or using what might be called
67 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 30. 1(a).
"6 For links to all of the papers that the DPSA Working Party has adopted since 1997, see Justice
and Home Affairs, Data Protection - Documents Adopted by the Data Protection Working Party,
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2006_en.htm (last visited Sept 25,
2007).
69 For example, in a recent opinion, after a lengthy discussion of a particular company's alleged
violations of Belgian and/or European law, the DPSA Working Party issued a blunt threat: "[iln case of
non-compliance, data controllers can expect to be subject to sanctions imposed by the competent
authorities under the Directive and national law, in order to enforce compliance." DPSA Working Party,
Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldhvide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) 27 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp 128_en.pdf.
70 The prohibition on collection and use without a legitimate basis is explicit in regard to "special"
categories of P11, DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 8.1 and recital 33, but implicit in regard to other types
of P11, id. art. 7 ("Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if..."). Id.
recital 30.
[Vol. 14
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS?
"ordinary" P1I. 7 ' The Directive strongly encourages but does not require a website
operator to seek consent when collecting and using what the Directive labels
"special" categories of P11. 72  Finally, a website operator may seek-but is not
required to seek-consent when transferring PII to a data controller located in a non-
EU country that fails to provide "adequate" protection for P1. 73 In each of these
situations, it is clear that a website operator also may collect and use a person's P11
without consent, if the operator relies on one of the other legitimate bases approved
by the Directive.
1. Consent to Process Ordinary PII
Article 7 of the DP Directive enumerates the conditions under which a person or
entity, including a website operator, may make "legitimate ' 74 use of an individual's
ordinary 75 P11. Not surprisingly, a website operator may use P11 if "the data subject
has unambiguously given his consent. 76 The Directive defines "the data subject's
consent" as "any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being
processed., 77  It is generally believed that opt-out consent 78 is sufficiently
"unambiguous" and thus that consent may be implied from a person's decision to
submit P11 in response to an appropriate request from a data controller.79 As
discussed below, implied consent will not suffice for collection and use of
"sensitive" P11. 80
The DP Directive allows a website operator to collect and use ordinary P11
without consent if one of several conditions is satisfied. A website operator may
collect and use an individual's P11 without consent to (i) perform a contract with the
individual,8' (2) comply with a "legal obligation,"8'2 or (3) protect the individual's
"vital interests. 83  The Directive also permits a website operator to use an
individual's P11 without consent if the "processing is necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the [website operator] . . . , except where such
interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the
71 See infra Part 1.
72 See infra Part 2.
73 See infra Part 3.
74 Article 7 falls within Part II, which is entitled "Criteria for Making Data Processing Legitimate."
DP Directive, supra note 42, section II. Article 7 requires that "Member States shall provide that personal
data may be processed only if' one of six enumerated conditions is satisfied. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
73 The DP Directive does not identify particular categories of P11 as "ordinary." As discussed in
Part 2, infra, however, the Directive does characterize certain categories of PHI as "sensitive" or "special."
As used in this Article, the term "ordinary" refers to PIH that does not qualify for the higher level of
protection granted to "sensitive" PII. Most types of PHl would be considered "ordinary" in this sense.
76 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 7(a).
71 Id. art. 2(h).
78 "Opt-out" consent arises when a person must take an affirmative step to forbid collection and use
of P1. See MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 758.
79 See Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-33.
80 See infra Part 2.
Si DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 7(b).
82 Id. art. 7(c).
" Id. art. 7(d).
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data subject . ,,8 This provision has been called the "business purposes" rule
because it permits a website operator to collect and use someone's PH1 for the
website operator's own purposes without consent.8 5 The website operator's purposes
must be "legitimate," which means in practice that the website operator must be able
to persuade the relevant DPSA that the purposes are legitimate, if the website
operator's activities are challenged.86 Moreover, the website operator's purposes
must yield if they conflict with the individual's "fundamental rights and freedoms,"
an undefined phrase to which DPSAs will give meaning in particular cases, subject
of course to judicial review.87 Given the central role of the DPSA in determining the
parameters of the "business purposes" rule, it is fair to say that the rule effectively
replaces an individual's consent to a particular use of PH1 with the DPSA's view of
whether such use is appropriate. The rule transforms a transaction between an
individual and a website operator into a transaction between a website operator and
the DPSA.8 8
One might respond that the individual's consent is relevant to one, if not two, of
the supposedly non-consensual bases for collecting and using ordinary P11. Consent
typically would be present if a website operator collects and uses P11 to fulfill a
contract with the individual from whom PHt was collected. Consent arguably also is
present if the website operator uses an individual's P11 for "business purposes,"
because the individual would not have provided the PHl if he or she did not
consent-at least tacitly-to its collection and use for the purposes indicated by the
business. According to this argument, consent is irrelevant only if the website
operator collects a person's Pl1 to meet a "legal obligation" or protect the person's
"vital interests." Although a website operator might be able to abuse these bases for
84 Id. art. 7(f).
85 See Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-3 1.
" DPSAs have the power to hear complaints, DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 28.4, and institute
proceedings against alleged violators, id. art. 28.3. Thus, to avoid further enforcement proceedings, a
website operator typically will have to persuade the DPSA that a particular use of P11 is legitimate.
Regardless of any action by the DPSA, however, individuals may seek a "judicial remedy for any breach
of the rights" granted under the Directive, id. art. 22, including compensation for damages, id. art. 23.1.
87 For discussions ofjudicial review of agency action in the EU and Member States, see Jorgen
Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85
(2004); Claudia Tobler, Note, The Standard of Judicial Review ofAdministrative Agencies in the U.S. and
EU: Accountability and Reasonable Agency Action, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213 (1999). For a
broader discussion ofjudicial review of Member State actions under EU law, see HENRY G. SCHERMERS
& DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 644-52 (6th ed. 2001).
88 The Directive establishes a sixth condition under which it is legitimate to collect Pll that is not
pertinent here. P11 may be processed if"processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to
whom the data are disclosed." DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 7(e). This provision is one of several
significant loopholes permitting government officials to collect and use PlI more or less as they see fit.
See, e.g., id. art. 3.2 (exempting from the Directive's coverage all data "processing operations concerning
public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal
law..."). Member State authorities are notably less forgiving when, for reasons of national security, U.S.
government officials seek to collect and use P11 related to Europeans. See Belgian Commission for the
Protection of Private Life, Summary of the Opinion on the Transfer of Personal Data by SCRL SWIFT
Following the UST (OFAC) Subpoenas, Sept. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.privacycommission.be/communiquds/summaryopinionSwift_/2028_09_2006.pdf.
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collecting and using Pi, they hardly represent gaping loopholes in a regime that
otherwise seems to emphasize consent.
There is merit to this response. Consent does matter under the DP Directive.
An individual may limit use of P11 by refusing consent. At the same time, this
response must confront one seemingly insurmountable objection based on the
express language of the Directive. Article 7 specifically identifies "unambiguous
consent" as one legitimate basis among several for collecting and using ordinary PI.
Although it is possible to find evidence of consent or consent-like behavior-
perhaps this might be termed "ambiguous consent" -with respect to at least two of
the other bases, Article 7 expressly treats these other bases as distinct, and therefore
different, from unambiguous consent. Thus, it is misleading to claim that these non-
consensual bases nevertheless require or presuppose informed consent. Of course,
one can always argue that the decision to submit P11 reflects a person's consent to
submit P11. But this is a tautology, not a legal argument, and as such, it implies
nothing about the rules that govern use of the person's P11. Indeed, as discussed
below,89 it is clear that under many, if not most, circumstances a person's consent,
however unambiguous, does not and cannot define or limit the person's rights or the
rights and obligations of the website operator, because those rights and obligations
are not established by consensual agreement. Rather, the rights and obligations are
established almost exclusively by the law itself as interpreted by the relevant DPSA.
2. Consent to Use "Sensitive" P11
Under Article 8 of the Directive, with narrow exceptions discussed below,
"Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life."90  The
Directive refers to these as "special categories of data" 9' or "sensitive"92 P11. The
Directive does not explain why these particular categories warrant heightened
protection,93 and it makes no provision for people who believe that some of these
categories do not need such protection. The Directive also makes no allowance for
people who believe that an unlisted category of P11 is "special" and deserves
heightened protection. One such omitted category is personal financial information.
In the United States, under many circumstances, an individual's financial
information receives special legal protection.94 Under the Directive, financial
'9 See infra Part C.
' DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 8. I.
' Id. section I1.
12 Id. recital 34.
93 The Directive simply asserts, in a recital, that personal "'data which are capable by their nature of
infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy should not be processed" except under narrowly defined
conditions. Id. recital 33.
"' John C. Dugan et al., Privacy and E-Commnerce in the United States, in E-COMMERCE LAW &
BUSINESS 9-96 to 9-915 (Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., 2003). See also U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION: KEY FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS Do NOT REQUIRE
INFORMATION RESELLERS TO SAFEGUARD ALL SENSITIVE DATA (June 2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06674.pdf (recommending that Congress require information resellers to
provide greater protection for sensitive personal information, particularly financial information).
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information receives no special protection. Similarly, P11 related to children receives
special protection in the United States under the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA) 95 but is treated as ordinary P1l under the Directive. Of
course, the general level of protection under the Directive is relatively high, so
failure to designate a particular category as "special" does not mean that the category
receives no legal protection. But if the Directive's list of "special" categories seems
strangely arbitrary, this is because the list imposes a legislative decision about the
categories of P11 that a person should value more highly instead of empowering
people to make such decisions for themselves.
A website operator or other data controller may collect and use "special" or
"sensitive" P11 under any of five narrowly'defined conditions. One condition-
discussed in greater detail below9 6 -is with the individual's explicit consent. A
website operator may collect and use such P11 without consent (I) to abide by
obligations under employment laws; 97 (2) in the "vital interests" of a person who "is
physically or legally incapable of giving his consent";98 (3) under certain conditions
if the website operator is a non-profit social organization such as a church or a
union; 99 or (4) if the P11 was "manifestly made public" or is necessary to establish or
defend "legal claims."' 00 The Directive permits Member States to establish, either
by law or through their DPSAs, other conditions under which a website operator can
collect and use "special" categories of PH1 without consent "for reasons of substantial
public interest."' 0 ' "Substantial public interest" comprises "areas such as public
health and social protection-especially in order to ensure the quality and cost-
effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for benefits and services in
the health insurance system-scientific research and government statistics."'' 0 2 For
purposes of this Article, there are three important points to make about these non-
consensual bases for collecting sensitive P11. First, they are narrowly drawn, and
this indicates that EU legislators knew how to push controllers to obtain consent
when they wished to do so. The Directive's emphasis on consent for collecting
sensitive Pll contrasts markedly with the Directive's approach to ordinary P11, where
legislators approved broadly worded alternatives to consent. Second, the list of non-
consensual bases for collecting sensitive PH1 appears to reflect a belief that the state's
administrative apparatus is the primary legitimate consumer of such P11. Hence,
such P11 may be collected as required by employment law or as needed by public
9' 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000). For a general discussion of COPPA, see Kightlinger, supra note
7 at 372-76; see also Dugan, supra note 94, at 9-94 to 9-96.
96 See infra notes 103 to 110 and accompanying text.
17 DP Directive, supra note 42, at art. 8.2(b).
98 Id. art. 8.2(c). It is worth noting that the "vital interests" exception to the prohibition on use of
sensitive PH1 is much narrower than the "vital interests" basis for using ordinary P11. See id art. 7(d)
(omitting the requirement that the person be "physically or legally incapable of giving his consent"). This
suggests, among other things, that a website operator may be allowed to collect and use PI without a
person's consent to protect the person's allegedly vital interests even if the website operator could have
obtained consent. It will fall to the DPSA to determine whether the person's interests were "vital" and
whether those interests were protected.
"9 Id. art. 8.2(d).
'ld. art. 8.2(e).
()Id. art. 8.4.
"02 Id. recital 34.
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institutions pursuing allegedly public interests. Third, the DPSA, not the individual,
has final authority to determine whether to establish new non-consensual bases for
collecting and using sensitive P11. Thus, whether a particular category of P11 is
sensitive ultimately depends not on how the individual values his or her own P11 but
on how DPSA officials value such PII.
Although the DP Directive allows collection and use of sensitive P11 with the
individual's consent, the Directive betrays a notable lack of confidence in the
individual's capacity to exercise that consent wisely. The Directive allows use of
sensitive P11 if the individual "has given his explicit consent to the processing of
those data, except where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition..
• may not be lifted by the data subject's giving his consent."' 0 3 This provision is
illuminating in two respects. First, it requires "explicit" consent, unlike the parallel
consent provision for ordinary P11. 104 In the online context, this means that "opt
in"' 05 consent is required to collect and use sensitive P1.0 6 Thus, before collecting
such P11, a website operator must provide a consent form containing the terms on
which P11 will be used, and persuade the individual to signify acceptance of those
terms by, for example, clicking a button that says "I ACCEPT." This suggests that
EU legislators were willing to give the individual consensual authority over his or
her sensitive P11, but only if the individual is confronted with an "in your face"
consent form designed to discourage carelessness and inattention. Apparently,
individuals were not trusted to handle their own sensitive P11 with sufficient care and
attention. Moreover, as the Directive strengthens the hand of the internet user, it also
enhances the role of the DPSA, which retains the ultimate authority, backed by
national and EU courts, to determine whether the words contained in the website
operator's consent form are satisfactory, i.e., sufficiently "explicit," in the
Directive's terms. The mere fact that a person clicked "I ACCEPT" before
providing sensitive Pll will not settle the question.
Second, the consent provision for sensitive P11 is illuminating because it
expressly permits EU Member States to limit or eliminate consent as a basis for
collecting and using sensitive P11. In a Member State that followed this course, a
person might not be permitted to authorize use of his or her own P11 if it falls into
one of the categories that the Directive deems "sensitive." This would mean, for
example, that I might not be permitted to authorize Amazon's United Kingdom
website (Amazon.UK)10 7 to record my interest in gay-themed literature and films,
because this could be deemed "processing of data concerning . . . sex life."' ' 8 It
I3 ld. art. 8.2(a).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text. It follows that the Directive permits "implicit" or tacit
consent for use of ordinary P11.
1,5 "Opt-in" consent arises when an organization has to obtain an individual's express permission
before collecting and using his or her PII. See MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 758.
'")6 Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-03 to 10-04.
1117 Amazon's web address in the United Kingdom actually is Amazon.co.uk, but I shorten it to
Amazon.UK in the Article for the sake of simplicity.
0' DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 8. 1. To readers outside the EU, this assertion may seem
somewhat farfetched. In fact, it is well within the realm of Member State practice. In one well-known
case, the Swedish data protection authority found that an airline computerized reservation service had
violated the law by recording the fact that a passenger preferred kosher food. According to the authority,
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would not be legally relevant that I may not regard this information as "sensitive" or
"special," or that I may want Amazon to record my interest in such books and films
in order to provide me with updates when new materials of interest are published.
Most Member States have chosen to recognize consent as a basis for collecting
and using sensitive PII.' 09 Nevertheless, it is revealing that EU lawmakers agreed
that a Member State reasonably could refuse to allow a person to consent to the use
of certain categories of his or her own P11. In effect, the Directive allows a Member
State to grant itself sole control over decisions about collection and use of precisely
those types of PH1 that the Directive declares to be "capable by their nature of
infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy."" 0  Thus, when the risk to personal
privacy is supposedly greatest, the Directive consistently shows a lack of confidence
in the individual's capacity to look after his or her own interests. It empowers the
DPSA to protect the person's privacy not only from aggressive website operators but
from the person himself or herself.
3. Consent to Transfer P11 Outside the EU
One important purpose of the DP Directive was to ensure that Pil could not be
transferred out of the EU without strong assurances that it would continue to receive
legal protection." Accordingly, the Directive imposes an export-control regime on
international data transfers. The interplay between consent and DPSA oversight
under this regime is sufficiently complex and interesting to warrant a separate article
that also would examine the impact of efforts to extend the geographical reach of the
Directive extraterritorially to certain controllers located outside the EU." 2  For
this preference tended to reveal that the passenger's religious beliefs, and therefore constituted sensitive
PII under the Directive. See DPSA Working Party, Recommendation 1/98 on Airline Computerised
Reservation Systems (CRS) 4 (Apr. 28, 1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/wp -en.pdf (explicit consent required to
collect sensitive data concerning religious dietary preferences).
"' See Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive Comparative Study
of National Laws 86-68 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreportconsultation/univessex-
comparativestudyen.pdf; See also European Commission, Analysis and Impact Study on the
Implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in Member States 12, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/consuitation/technical-annex en.pdf.
10 See supra note 93.
S'See DP Directive, supra note 42, recital 57 ("transfer of personal data to a third country which
does not ensure an adequate level of protection must be prohibited"); see also DPSA Working Party,
Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the
EU Data Protection l6irective 8 (July 24, 1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/wp I2en.pdf (a "missing element" of the
Council of Europe's 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data "is the absence of restrictions on transfers to countries not party to it").
112 The Directive asserts extraterritorial legal authority over controllers who are "not established on
Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal data make use of equipment, automated or
otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State..." Id. art. 4. 1(c). According to the DPSAs,
under this provision, EU/Member State law will apply to a website operator based outside the EU who
collects PII directly from individuals residing in the EU after placing a small text file called a "cookie" on
the individual's computer. DPSA Working Party, Working Document on Determining the International
Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the Internet by Non-EU Based
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purposes of this Article, however, it is important to note only the salient features of
the regime. The Directive tightly restricts most transfers of P11 from the EU to a
"third country," which for practical purposes means any country that is outside the
European Economic Area.' 13 Such transfers are permitted without restriction only if
the third country "ensures an adequate level of protection.""14 The Directive does
not define the term "adequate" and provides limited guidance concerning how
adequacy is to be assessed.' 1 5 The Directive authorizes the European Commission,
working in cooperation with a committee of Member State officials, to make
adequacy determinations." 16 Once the Commission determines that a third country
provides adequate protection, a website operator is permitted to transfer a person's
P11 to a data controller in that country without the person's consent or any other
special protections.' 17
If a website operator wishes to transfer P11 to a data controller in a third country
such as the United States that has not been deemed to provide adequate protection by
EU standards,' t the operator is faced with an array of legal options similar to those
discussed aboveii 9 for collecting and using ordinary P11. The operator may
Web Sites 10-01 (May 30, 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.etIjustice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp56__en.pdf.
"
3 See Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-01. The European Economic Area contains the 27 Member
States of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The Directive frequently uses the phrase "third
country" or "third countries" but does not provide a definition. See, e.g., DP Directive, supra note 42,
recitals 20, 37, 56, and arts. 19.1(e), 25, 26.
.4 Id. art. 25.1.
... Id. art. 25.2.
" Id. arts. 25.6, 31.2. To date, the Commission has found that three countries - Argentina, Canada,
and Switzerland - and two dependencies of the British Crown - Guernsey and the Isle of Man - provide
adequate protection for P11. See Commission Decisions on The Adequacy of The Protection of Personal
Data in Third Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/indexen.htm. The
EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement establishes a set of privacy principles that a U.S.-based company can
adopt voluntarily in order to be deemed to provide adequate protection for P11 exported from the EU. For
the U.S. Commerce Department's explanation of the Safe Harbor Agreement, see U.S Commerce
Department, Welcome to Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited October 4, 2007).
17 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 25.
..To date, the European Commission has never made a formal finding that the level of protection in
a third country is inadequate. Thus, despite suggestions to the contrary in the secondary literature, see
e.g., MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 215, there is no finding that the level of protection in the United
States is not adequate by EU standards. Clearly, however, it was a premise of the negotiations that led to
the adoption of the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement, see supra note 116 and accompanying text, that the
general level of protection for PII in the United States is not adequate. Reflecting this view, the DPSA
Working Party has stated that "the patchwork of narrowly focused sectoral laws and self-regulatory rules
presently existent in the United States cannot be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for
personal data transferred from the European Union." DPSA Working Party, Opinion 2/99 on the
Adequacy of the "International Safe Harbor Principles" Issued by the US Department of Commerce on
19th April 1999, at 2 (May 3, 1999) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice..home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wpI9en.pdf. Concurring in this view,
Professors Schwartz and Reidenberg stated that "[t]he treatment of personal inlormation in the U.S.
private sector does not always fulfill the standards of protection found in the European principles." Paul
M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, DATA PRIVACY LAw 396 (1996). See Patrick J. Murray, Comment,
The Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 932, 1013-3017 (1998) (arguing U.S. privacy protection in private sector is
generally not adequate by EU standards).
"9 See supra Part I.
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undertake such a transfer if the individual has "given his consent unambiguously.' 2 °
The operator may transfer Pil without consent (1) to perform a contract between the
website operator and the individual, or to implement "precontractual measures"; (2)
to conclude or perform a contract "concluded in the interest of the data subject
between the controller and a third party"; (3) when "necessary or legally required on
important public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of
legal claims"; (4) to protect the individual's "vital interests"; or (5) when the transfer
originates from a public register of P1l.' 2' Although this is not the place for a
detailed discussion of these provisions, it should be clear that a savvy website
operator--or a website operator with a savvy attorney-often will be able to rely on
them to transfer P11 without an individual's consent to third countries that lack
adequate protection.
The Directive also allows a website operator to transfer PII without consent to a
third country that lacks adequate protection "where the controller adduces adequate
safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and
freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights[;]
such safeguards may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses."'1
22
Under this "adequate safeguards" provision, the website operator "adduces" the
safeguards not to the person whose PH1 will be transferred but to DPSAs and/or
European Commission officials who determine whether the safeguards are legally
adequate. 23  Some DPSAs require that contractual safeguards for international
transfers be pre-approved on a case-by-case basis, while others will allow a website
operator to export PHl under self-imposed safeguards until challenged to defend
them. 124  The Directive also authorizes the European Commission to approve
"standard contractual clauses"' 25 that will be deemed to provide adequate safeguards
for transfers to data controllers in countries lacking adequate protection. To date, the
Commission has approved two such standard clauses. 26  In practice, website
operators and other data controllers treat the Commission's standard clauses as the
baseline for adequacy. 127 One point should be clear from this description of the
120 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 26. l(a). "Unambiguous" consent for an international transfer
may be tacit or opt-out consent in most instances. See supra note 104 and the accompanying text.
121 DP Directive, supra note 42, arts. 26. l(b)-(f.
122 Id. art. 26.2.
123 Article 26.2 states that safeguards must be "adduced" but does not say to whom. The website
operator clearly does not have to adduce safeguards to the individual whose PHI the operator plans to
export. The "adequate safeguards" rule is an alternative to consent, so the individual typically is out of
the loop. The remainder of Article 26 leaves little doubt that DPSAs and the European Commission are in
charge. Under Article 26.3, "[tjhe Member State shall inform the Commission and the other Member
States of the authorizations it grants pursuant to paragraph 2." Id. art. 26.3.
124 See Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-05.
125 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 26.4. The procedure for adopting standard contractual clauses,
id. art. 31(2), involves consultation with a committee of"representatives of the Member States... chaired
by the representative of the Commission." Id. art. 31.1.
126 Commission Decision of 15 June 2001 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of
Personal Data to Third Countries, Under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19; Commission Decision
of 27 December 2001 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors
Established in Third Countries, Under Directive 95/46/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 6) 52. The Directive defines a
"processor" as "a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes
personal data on behalf of the controller." DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(e).
127 See Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-06.
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"adequate safeguards" regime: the consent of the individual plays no role. A
website operator who "adduces" such safeguards may transfer an individual's P1I to
a third country without seeking the individual's consent. Here again, administrative
control by the DPSA substitutes for individual consent and defines the space within
which consent may operate.
C. Consent Is Never Enough
Under the DP Directive, the informed consent of a person is never sufficient to
ensure that a website operator may collect and use the person's P11 lawfully. This is
because the Directive imposes a panoply of obligations on website operators that
have little or nothing to do with a person's consent. As briefly discussed in the
following Subparts, these include requirements to (1) obtain a license from or
register with a DPSA to process P11; (2) satisfy various "data quality" requirements;
(3) provide a variety of information to the individual whose P11 is to be collected;
(4) grant the individual access to his or her Pil, and the opportunity to correct
mistaken information; and (5) adopt security measures to protect Pil.' 28 Although
consent plays a limited role in the Directive's treatment of some of these
requirements, the requirements do not flow from the individual's consent. Failure to
comply with any of these requirements is a separate violation, and the DPSA
Working Party has taken the position that an individual cannot release a website
operator from these requirements by consent in, for example, the context of a
contractual agreement. 121
1. Data Processing Licensed by the State
The Directive requires a prospective data controller such as a website operator
to notify the relevant DPSA prior to any "wholly or partly automatic" collection or
use of PII.130  it is only a slight exaggeration to call this prior notification
requirement a licensing regime. The Directive requires each Member State to
identify those types of "processing operations likely to present specific risks to the
rights and freedoms of data subjects" and to "check that these processing operations
are examined prior to the start thereof."' 3' Such checking may be carried out either
by the DPSA or the controller's in-house "data protection official,' 32 if any. It
2These issues are discussed infra in Parts I through 5.
.29 See DPSA Working Party, Opinion 1/98: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open
Profiling Standard (OPS) I (June 16, 1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/l1998/wp I len.pdf.
13" DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 18. 1. At a minimum, the notification must include (l) the
website operator's name and address; (2) the purpose(s) for which the operator will be processing PII; (3)
the categories of people whose data the operator will process; (4) the categories of P1l that the operator
will process; (5) a list of recipients or categories of recipients to whom PII may be disclosed; (6) any
proposed transfers to countries outside the EU; and (7) a description of the steps that the operator will take
to comply with the Directive's data security requirements. Id. art. 19. 1 (a)-().
" ' Id. art. 20. 1.
132 The Member States may provide for simplified notification or exemption from notification for (I)
data processing activities that the Member State deems to be low-risk and/or (2) data controllers that
appoint an independent "data protection official" to oversee the controller's data processing activities. Id.
art. 18.2. If a data controller appoints an in-house data protection official, the official is required to
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clearly is accurate to say that the Directive establishes a licensing regime for
processing operations subject to prior "checking," because collection and use may
proceed only after the DPSA approves, explicitly or implicitly.'33 With respect to
collection or use of PIH not designated for prior checking, it would be more accurate
to say that the Directive establishes a registration regime. 34  Thus, a registered
website operator does not have to await the approval of the DPSA simply to collect
and use Pil, but failure to register renders such collection and use illegal.
The interplay between informed consent and registration/licensing under the DP
Directive can be described in one word: nonexistent. Under the Directive, the
requirement to register or obtain a license to collect and use P11 is independent of
any consent that a website operator may obtain to collect and use a particular
person's P11. Rather, the registration/licensing requirements empower the DPSA and
bring all collection and use of PH1 under administrative scrutiny. As the Directive
states, the notification requirements "are designed to ensure disclosure of the
purposes and main features of any processing operation for the purpose of
verification that the operation is in accordance with the national measures taken
under this Directive."' 35  The use of the term "verification"'' 36 suggests that the
DPSA should actively review registrations for compliance with national law and not
simply await complaints from people injured by non-compliance.
2. Data Quality Requirements
The DP Directive requires data controllers 37 such as website operators to
comply with various "data quality principles."' 138 A website operator is required to
maintain a register of the controller's processing activities and ensure that the data controller abides by
applicable law. In effect, the official stands in for the DPSA in connection with notification requirements.
133 According to a recital, "Member States must provide that the supervisory authority, or the data
protection official in cooperation with the authority, check such processing prior to it being carried out;
[and] following this prior check, the supervisory authority may, according to its national law, give an
opinion or an authorization regarding the processing .... I" d. recital 54. The Directive does offer an
alternative to such case-by-case prior authorization. A Member State may specify by law or regulation
the types of data processing that place individual rights and freedoms at risk, and identify the conditions
under which those types of processing may occur. The DPSA apparently will not have to pre-approve
individual instances of such processing that meet the relevant conditions. Id.34 The United Kingdom's law implementing the Directive uses the term "registration" to
characterize the prior notification system. See Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 18, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts 1998/19980029.htm [hereinafter UK Data Protection Act].
13 DP Directive, supra note 42, recital 48.
1
36 The French version of the Directive uses the term '"contr6le" where the English version uses the
term "verification." Thus, the French version indicates that the DPSA should use registration information
to exercise "control" over data processing activity that does not comply with French law. Directive
95/46/CE du Parlement Europen et du Conseil du 24 Octobre 1995 Relative A la Protection des
Personnes Physiques A It'gard do Traitement des Donndes A Caract~re Personnel et A la Libre Circulation
de ces Donnees, recital 48, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-56-
ce/dir1995-56_part2 fr.pdf (second part). Under the case law of the European courts, "a particular
provision [of EC legislation] should not be considered in isolation but in cases of doubt should be
interpreted and applied in the light of the other official languages." Case T-80/97, Starway v. Council,
2000 E.C.R. 11-3099 (EU).
137 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 6.2 (imposing on data controllers the requirement to comply
with data quality principles).
138 Id. section I (entitled "Principles Relating to Data Quality").
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ensure that P11 is (1)"processed fairly and lawfully"; (2) "collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible
with those purposes"; (3) "adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to [those]
purposes"; (4) "accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date"; and (5) "kept in a
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for
the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed."'139 These principles are stated in very general terms and the Directive
provides almost no guidance concerning their interpretation. The principles clearly
have little to do with consent, and a great deal to do with the authority of the DPSA.
The requirement that P11 be collected and used "fairly" provides a good
illustration.140 A recital provides the Directive's only gloss on this requirement: "if
the processing of data is to be fair, the data subject must be in a position to learn of
the existence of a processing operation and, where data are collected from him, must
be given accurate and full information, bearing in mind the circumstances of the
collection.' 4 ' It seems unlikely, however, that EU legislators would have chosen a
general term such as "fair" if what they meant was "not secret" or "not properly
informed." The DPSA Working Party has stated that "[fjor personal data to be
processed fairly they must be processed in a way that does not bring about unfairness
to the data subject. This is potentially a very wide-ranging requirement."' 42  Not
surprisingly, the DPSA Working Party has opined that in some circumstances
collection and use of P11 "may be unfair even if the [individual] has consented.'
43
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the DPSAs believe the fairness principle
gives them broad authority to mandate specific practices as "fair" and prohibit other
practices as "unfair."' 144 Citing fairness and other data quality principles, the DPSAs
'
39 Id. art. 6.1(aHe).
4 Id. art. 6.1(a).
14' Id. recital 38.
112 DPSA Working Party, Opinion 8/2001 on the Processing of Personal Data in the Employment
Context 18 (Sept. 13, 2001 ), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001 /wp48en.pdf.
143 id.
14 For examples of the Working Party's use of the fairness principle to impose detailed requirements
on collection and use of PI1, see DPSA Working Party, Working Document Privacy on the Internet - An
Integrated EU Approach to On-line Data Protection 37 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2000/wp37en.pdf (unfair to use an email
address "'collected in a public space on the Internet" for direct marketing purposes); DPSA Working Party,
Recommendation 2/2001 on Certain Minimum Requirements for Collecting Personal Data On-line in the
European Union 6-6 (May 17, 200 ]), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp43en.pdf (unfair to collect PHI online
before providing specified list of information); DPSA Working Party, Working Document on Determining
the International Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the Internet by
Non-EU Based Web Sites 13 (May 30, 2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacyldocs/wpdocs/20021wp56en.pdf (fairness requires "the
individual should have the possibility to accept or refuse the placing of a cookie and ... to determine what
data he wishes to be processed by the cookie"); DPSA Working Party, Sixth Annual Report on the
Situation Regarding the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
Privacy in the European Union and in Third Countries 29 (Dec. 16, 2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/2003-3th-annuareport-en.pdf (under
"principles of fair and lawful use, the data subject has to be informed every time a creditor makes an entry
into the reporting system"); DPSA Working Party, Opinion 5/2004 on Unsolicited Communications for
Marketing Purposes under Article 13 of Directive 2002/58/EC 6 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
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have prescribed in considerable detail the terms under which a website operator may
collect and use Pil.
145
3. Information Requirements
The DP Directive requires a data controller such as a website operator to supply
specified information when collecting an individual's P11. The operator must
disclose: (I) the operator's identity; (2) the purposes for which the PiH is being
collected and used; and (3) "any further information . . . in so far as such further
information is necessary . . . to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data
subject."' 146 The Directive provides three examples of such "further information":
(1) "the recipients or categories of recipients of the data;" (2) "whether replies to the
questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of failure
to reply;" and (3) "the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the
data."
147
At first blush, the Directive's information requirements cast doubt on this
Article's argument that informed consent takes a back seat to bureaucratic control
under the Directive. Surely the purpose of the information requirements is to ensure
that an individual receives detailed notice about how his or her P1H will be used prior
to consenting to its collection. The information requirements thus assist a person in
providing a "freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes"'
' 48
concerning collection and use of P11. There is, of course, some truth to this claim.
The information requirements do help to ensure that, insofar as a person's consent is
legally relevant under the Directive, information will be available on which the
person can base that consent. What is lacking in the Directive, however, is any
suggestion that there is a legal relationship between the information requirements
and the individual's consent, or that compliance with the information requirements
will suffice to ensure that an individual's consent is informed. On the contrary, the
Directive's references to consent are contained in provisions that are entirely
separate from the Directive's information requirements. 49 A DPSA may treat
failure to supply the requisite information as a violation regardless of whether the
individual's consent was the legal basis for collecting and using the individual's PII.
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp9Oen.pdf (email harvesting unlawful
because, inter alia, unfair).
"4 For an example of the highly detailed requirements that the DPSAs may seek to impose on a
website operator such as Microsoft, see DPSA Working Party, Working Document on On-line
Authentication Services 6-61 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68 en.pdf. The author should disclose
here that at one time he represented Microsoft on data protection issues in the EU. He played no role in
the negotiations that culminated in the arrangements outlined in the foregoing paper by the DPSA
Working Party.
146 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. i 0(a)-{c).
'7 Id. art. 10(c). The Directive imposes a very similar information requirement on a website
operator who collects an individual's P11 from a source other than the pertinent individual (e.g., a
company that sells address lists or P1I databases). Id. art. I 1.I.
1
4 8 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
"
9 See DP Directive, supra note 42, arts. 7(a), 8.2(a), and 26. I (a) (bestowing legal significance on
the data subject's consent without reference to the provision of information) and arts. 10 and I I (requiring
provision of information without reference to the subject's consent).
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Moreover, the Directive does not require a website operator to provide the
information outlined in the information requirements to the individual at the time of,
or in the context of, data collection. For example, at least one national law
implementing the Directive appears to permit a data controller to satisfy the
requirement to specify the purposes for which P11 will be collected and used either
by providing that information to the person from whom the P11 is collected or by
providing that information to the DPSA in the data controller's registration.'50
Clearly, information residing in the DPSA's registration database has a tenuous
relationship at best with an individual's informed consent during a transaction with,
for example, Amazon.UK. Finally, even assuming the Directive's information
requirements facilitate informed consent in many situations, it is important to note
that the requirements include an open-ended obligation to supply whatever details
may be needed to ensure that collection and use of P11 is "fair." Thus, a website
operator could comply with the precise language of the information requirements, an
individual could supply P11, thereby apparently consenting to its use under the terms
that the operator had specified, and yet the DPSA still could take the position that the
individual did not receive sufficient information to ensure that this collection and use
of P11 was "fair."'' Here again, the website operator's primary concern may be to
satisfy the DPSA and not to inform the individual.
4. Rights of Access, Correction, and Objection.
The DP Directive grants a person the right to access and seek
correction of his or her P11. A Member State must ensure that a person has
the right to confirm (I) whether or not a website operator is making use of
the person's Pll; (2) the purposes for which P11 is being used; (3) the
categories of PI1 in use; and (4) "the recipients or categories of recipients to
whom the [P1l is] disclosed."'' 5 2  In addition, Member States must give
people the right to rectify or erase P11, particularly if "incomplete or
inaccurate." ' 153 A person's consent is irrelevant to the rights of access and
correction.
In addition to establishing rights of access and correction, Member
States must give a person the right:
"s0 UK Data Protection Act, supra note 134, sched. I, part 2, 15.
... The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act, for example, states that collection and use of PII will
not be considered "'fair" unless the data subject is provided with the information indicated in the
Directive's information requirements. Id. sched. I, part 11, 1 2( I). The Act then states that the
information that must be provided includes "any further information which is necessary, having regard to
the specific circumstances in which the data are or are to be processed, to enable processing in respect of
the data subject to be fair." Id. sched. I, part 11, 1 2(3)(d). Thus, in order to ensure that processing is fair,
the data controller must provide all information necessary to ensure that the processing is fair. The DPSA
and the courts ultimately will decide how to satisfy this circular "'fairness" requirement.
152 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 12(a). If the individual wishes, he or she also may obtain the PHI
itself "in an intelligible form" as well as details about the source of the PH1. Id.
513 Id. art. 12(b). The website operator or other data controller is also required to notify anyone to
whom the individual's PII has been disclosed that rectification, erasure, or blocking has occurred, if the
individual so requests and if doing so does not "prove[] impossible or involve[] a disproportionate effort."
Id. art. 12(c).
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at least in the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (f), to object at any time
on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the
processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by
national legislation. Where there is a justified objection, the processing
instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data.
5 4
The "cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f)" are among those in which a
website operator may collect a person's P11 without consent.'55 Thus, having
granted website operators the power to collect and use a person's P11 without
consent, the Directive returns a measure of control by giving the person a right to
find out whether a particular website operator is using his or her P11 and then
empowering the person to object. But it is important to note that the right to object
or opt out of data collection and use is not unconditional. A person has to be able to
show "compelling legitimate grounds" before his or her objection will force a
website operator to stop using the person's P11. In the Directive's terminology, an
objection must be "justified," and a website operator is within his or her rights to
request a reason before heeding an objection. By granting the person a right to
object but requiring the website operator to comply only if the objection is justified,
the Directive clearly enhances the authority of the individual but also and more
importantly augments the authority of the DPSA. In any particular case, the DPSA
and courts, not the individual, would determine what constitutes a "justified"
objection based on "compelling legitimate grounds."
5. Security Measures
In one other area, the DP Directive imposes significant requirements on website
operators that are independent of the consent of an individual whose P11 the operator
may collect or use. Website operators and other data controllers must "implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect" the security of PI.
156
This is not the proper place for a detailed review of the Directive's security
requirements and how they fit into the mosaic of rules that the EU has implemented
in the fields of network security and cybercrime.'57 For purposes of this Article, the
important point is that the Directive implicitly vests in the DPSA the responsibility
for determining whether in any particular instance a website operator is providing
sufficient security. Here again, the Directive assigns no legal significance to the
consent of the individual whose P11 is being protected. Thus, one would expect the
website operator to treat website security as yet another transaction with the DPSA
rather than with the individual.
14Id. art. 14(a). Member States also must grant the individual the right to object to use of his or her
P11 for "purposes of direct marketing." Id. art. 14(b).
'55See supra notes 84 through 88 and accompanying text.
156 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 17. 1. In addition to this general requirement to protect the
security of Pii, the Directive imposes special requirements on website operators and other data controllers
who outsource processing operations. Such a website operator must enter into a contract with the third-
party processor stating that the latter will act only on instructions of the former and will abide by the
security requirements of the Member State in which the former is established. Id. art. 17.3.
'57 For a brief overview of European rules and agreements governing Intemet security and
cybersecurity, see D. Jean Veta et al., Cybersecurity: Risk and Liability in the New Information
Environment, in E-COMMERCE LAW & BUSINESS 16-605 to 16-614 (Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., 2003).
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D. Consent under the ECDP Directive
A detailed discussion of the ECDP Directive is beyond the scope of this Article,
because the ECDP Directive was intended to address a number of data protection
issues that have only limited relevance to the internet.158 Thus, for example, the
ECDP Directive regulates (1) collection and use of "traffic data" generated by
telephone systems and digital networks during electronic communications;' 59 (2)
collection and use of "location data" of the sort generated by cellular phones or other
mobile electronic appliances;'
6 ° (3) use of data in telephone and e-mail directories;'
6'
and (4) certain types of wire tapping or data interception.1 62 The ECDP Directive
introduces some kind of consent requirement or option in most of the areas that it
regulates. 63 For example, in the EU, unsolicited direct marketing by e-mail is seen
as a data protection issue, and the ECDP Directive tightly restricts such marketing by
requiring marketers in most situations to obtain the recipients' prior opt-in
consent. 64  The ECDP Directive also requires websites to give a user the
opportunity to opt out of the placement of "cookies" on his or her personal
computer. 
65
One might contend that the ECDP Directive's emphasis on consent casts doubt
on a key argument of this Article, namely that the EU's approach to online privacy
tends to substitute administration by DPSAs for individual consent. In fact, it would
be more accurate to describe the ECDP Directive as the exception that proves the
rule. First, the ECDP Directive is narrowly targeted at specific problems, whereas
the DP Directive is horizontal and applies to all aspects of a website's collection and
use of an individual's P11. Thus, the emphasis on consent in the ECDP Directive in
no way undermines the claim that the DP Directive tends to empower DPSAs and
limit the significance of consent. Indeed, the ECDP Directive's narrowly crafted
provisions seem to signal an effort to enhance the importance of, and at the same
time carefully circumscribe, individual consent. They certainly do not signal a broad
shift from DPSA oversight to informed consent as the primary focus of privacy
protection. Underlining this point, the ECDP Directive significantly expands the
'
58 For more on the ECDP Directive, see Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-08 to 10-00.
ECDP Directive, supra note 43, art. 6.
160Id. art. 9.
16 1/d. art. 12.
1
62 Id. art. 5.
163 See, e.g. id. arts. 6.3 (consent to use of "traffic data" to market communications services or
provide enhanced services to subscribers), 9.1 (consent to use location data to provide enhanced
communications services), and 12.3 (consent to allow searching of phone or email directories by
identifiers other than name).
4 Id. art. 13. 1. The ECDP Directive carves out an important exception for e-mail that is sent to the
sender's own customers, provided those customers have not objected and the e-mail concerns products or
services that are similar to those that the customer already has purchased. Id. art. 13.2. For a detailed
discussion of the EU's complex and somewhat confusing approach to marketing e-mail, see Mark E.
Plotkin et al., Consumer Protection, in E-COMMERCE LAW & BUSINESS 14-43 to 14-404 (Mark E.
Plotkin et al. eds., 2003).
16' ECDP Directive, supra note 43, recital 25.
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power of the DPSAs by authorizing them to "carry out the tasks laid down in [the
,,i66DP Directive] with regard to matters covered by this Directive ....
Second, and related to the first, the ECDP Directive supplements the DP
Directive in two ways: in some areas it fills perceived gaps in the DP Directive's
regulatory structure and in others it arguably16alters the rules that would pertain if
the DP Directive remained the applicable law. To the extent that the ECDP
Directive fills gaps by, for example, introducing rules covering certain types of data
that might not qualify as P11 under the DP Directive,168 the ECDP Directive's
emphasis on consent tells us nothing about the significance attached to consent under
the DP Directive. To the extent that the ECDP Directive alters the regime that
would apply under the DP Directive by replacing or supplementing a prohibition or a
mandate with a consent provision, it would appear to follow that the DP Directive
itself must have attached little or no legal significance to consent in the relevant area.
Otherwise, a new consent provision would not be necessary. Thus, the references to
consent in the ECDP Directive support the argument that the primary effect of the
DP Directive is to empower DPSAs rather than individual adult internet users.
Third, it is important to note that the EU adopted the ECDP Directive seven
years after adopting the DP Directive. Based on my work as an attorney and
lobbyist on privacy issues in Europe during the relevant time period, I believe that
the ECDP Directive's emphasis on consent reflects the heated political debate that
developed after the DP Directive was adopted. In private meetings, company
officials, trade associations, and attorneys practicing in the data-protection field
sought to persuade officials to make broad use of the consent language in the DP
Directive and criticized official reliance on mandates and prohibitions that
effectively shifted responsibility and authority from individuals to DPSAs. Perhaps
recognizing the political force of claims that people should be allowed to decide for
themselves whether and how their P11 will be collected and used, the officials who
drafted the new ECDP Directive backed away from the DPSA-centered approach of
the DP Directive in several areas and interposed consent requirements. 69 This
suggests a shift in mindset on the part of EU legislators-a shift that arguably was
triggered in part by the hostile response in many quarters to the DP Directive. If
criticism of the DP Directive was one reason for the increased emphasis on consent
reflected in the more recent ECDP Directive, this too would support the argument
that the DP Directive attaches limited legal significance to individual consent.
'66Id. art. 15.3.
167 The claim is arguable because the ECDP Directive does not purport to repeal or supersede any
provisions of the DP Directive.
'68 For example, the ECDP Directive regulates use of "traffic data" that facilitate movement of
communications over electronic networks but that arguably are not - or at least not always - P1I covered
by the DP Directive. Id. art. 2(b) (defining "traffic data").
'69 One also can see evidence of the increasing emphasis on consent by comparing the ECDP
Directive and the law that it revised and replaced, the TDP Directive. See supra notes 48 and 49 and
accompanying text. The latter, which was adopted in 1997, contained a variety of strict prohibitions and
requirements and made minimal use of consent. Although the ECDP Directive was adopted just five
years after the TDP Directive, the former made far greater use of consent requirements.
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E. EU Internet Privacy-The Bottom Line
This Part of the Article shows in some detail that the EU internet privacy regime
subjects website operators who collect and use PII to continuous, far-reaching
administrative oversight that begins before P11 is collected and ends, if at all, only
after P11 has been destroyed or rendered anonymous via removal of personal
identifiers. The regime accomplishes this by requiring all data controllers to register
with a DPSA and comply with broadly worded mandates that empower DPSAs to
evaluate, influence, and in many instances control, the terms and conditions for P11
collection and use. Although the DP Directive recognizes that the individual's
consent can play a role in protecting the privacy of PII, the Directive permits
extensive non-consensual use of P11. Consent can safely take a back seat precisely
because it is the job of the DPSA, not the individual, to protect the privacy of PII
from threats posed by data controllers such as website operators and, if possible,
from the negative consequences of the individual's own consensual decisions.
IV. EU PRIVACY LAW AND THE POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM
This Part examines the EU internet privacy regime in light of the account of the
post-Enlightenment paradigm summarized in Part 11. In particular, this Part shows
that the EU regime reflects and reinforces the three key elements of the paradigm:
the individualization of privacy and the attendant emphasis on consent, the
fundamentally ambivalent market relationship of the individual to his or her P11, and
the overarching need for expert, impersonal bureaucratic administration by
corporations and public officials. Examining the EU regime in light of the paradigm
also reveals some important limitations of the paradigm itself, centered around the
paradigm's seeming inability to explain and justify human conduct in personal
relationships of trust and intimacy.
A. Individuals & Consent
Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the individual becomes the primary, if
not the sole, unit of social theoretical analysis170 and thus one would expect an
internet privacy regime to focus on protecting and regulating the P11 of individuals.
In this respect, the DP Directive clearly reflects and reinforces the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. The first evidence of the Directive's focus on individuals
is the title of the Directive itself: "on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data."'' In recitals,
the Directive repeatedly announces its focus as "protection of the rights and
freedoms of individuals"'7 2 or the "fundamental rights . . . of individuals.' 73 The
particular individual right that the Directive purports to protect is privacy. 74 The
170 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
171 DP Directive, supra note 42.
172 See, e.g., id. recitals 7-9, It, 68.
13 See, e.g., id. recitals 3, 34, 37. See also id. arts. 25.6, 26.2, 26.3, 28.2 (referring in various ways
to protection of the "fundamental" or "basic" rights and freedoms of individuals).
74 See, e.g., id. art. 1.1 and recitals 2, 7, 9, II and 68; but see id. recital 34 (apparently distinguishing
between "fundamental rights" and the "privacy of individuals").
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operational provisions of the Directive do not refer to protection of the individual,
but they leave no doubt that the individual is the primary, if not the sole, object of
the Directive's concern. The Directive applies to the PHI of the "data subject" who is
"an identified or identifiable natural person," i.e., an individual. 7 5 P11, or "personal
data" in the parlance of the Directive, is any information related to such an identified
or identifiable individual. 76 The individual data subject is tantamount to the subject
of a descriptive sentence, and each item of PII, each personal datum, is a predicate of
that subject, which or who is always singular. Mark Kightlinger is tall, forty-seven,
white, male, gay, an attorney, a professor, a writer, a brother, a son, a messy
housekeeper. These predicates are personal data about the identifiable individual
"Mark Kightlinger."
Also consistent with the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the DP Directive treats
consent as the primary means by which the individual can exercise legal authority
over collection and use of P11. The Directive effectively prohibits a website operator
from collecting, using and/or exporting ordinary or sensitive PHI without a
recognized legal basis for doing so. One of the legal bases that the Directive
recognizes in each instance is consent. 77 By implication, therefore, the Directive
treats all other legal bases for collecting, using, and/or exporting PHI as non-
consensual.178 Under the Directive, consent yields a "freely given specific and
informed indication of [the individual's] wishes" with respect to collection and use
of his or her P1. 179 Thus, consensual use of the individual's PIH should reflect the
individual's wishes. Part C infra argues that non-consensual use of PHI typically will
reflect the wishes of a website operator or other business organization under the
supervision of a DPSA. As one would expect under the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, the individual has little control over such non-consensual uses of P11. The
individual has a right to be informed of such uses'80 and may express an objection to
them, 8 ' but a website operator must heed the objection only under ill-defined
circumstances that will demand DPSA oversight.
As was the case under the U.S. internet privacy regime, 82 the DP Directive's
focus on individuals and consent fits awkwardly with the social reality that the
Directive itself recognizes. Take one example that I briefly discussed in the U.S.
context. 83  Assume that the data subject mentioned above-Mark Kightlinger
(MK)-has a boyfriend named Gordon Goodlooking (GG). MK has good reason to
believe that GG is gay. Under the Directive, the mere fact that MK might collect
this item of sensitive PHi about GG does not transform MK into a controller subject
1
75 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
177 See supra Part B.
1
78 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (non-consensual bases for collecting and using
ordinary P11), notes 97-102 (non-consensual bases for collecting and using sensitive P11), and notes 121-
127 and accompanying text (non-consensual bases for exporting PiH to third countries that lack "adequate"
protection).
19 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
'
81 See supra Part 3.
181 See supra Part 4
182 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 393-397.
"' ld. at 395- 396.
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to the Directive's requirements. The reason is that the Directive explicitly does not
cover collection or use of P11 "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal.
. . activity."'8 4 But if MK provides the item of P11 "GG is gay" to a website
operator, perhaps in response to a marketing survey, several provisions of the
Directive would apply. For example, the website operator would be required to
identify a recognized legal basis for collecting and using the P11. As discussed
above, information about GG's sex life is considered "sensitive,'' and the rules
governing sensitive P11 would push the website operator to obtain GG's opt-in
consent before collecting such P11 from MK. 8 6 MK's consent to the collection of
P11 about GG would be legally irrelevant. Assuming the website operator had a
sufficient legal basis for collecting sensitive P11 about GG, the website operator
would be required to inform GG, among other things, that the website operator has
collected GG's P11 and how the website operator plans to use the PI1. 87 The fact
that the website operator may have provided that same information to MK would be
legally irrelevant. In other words, although the Directive expressly recognizes a
space for "purely personal" activity in which one person may hold P11 about another
without incurring legal obligations, the Directive still assigns each item of P11 to an
individual when imposing rules governing consent and information. The same can
be said about rules governing the individual's right to access and correct P11. 188 MK
would have no right to access and/or correct GG's P11 once that P11 is in the
possession of a controller despite the fact that the controller may have obtained the
P11 from MK and regardless of the nature of the relationship between MK and GG.
Thus far, perhaps, the DP Directive's emphasis on the individual's consensual
authority over his or her P1I may seem sensible. After all, the sentence "GG is gay"
seems to recite a fact about GG, so perhaps it makes sense for the Directive to assign
consensual authority over that fact to GG and not to MK, even if MK learned the fact
about GG by interacting directly with GG in the purely personal space. Assume,
however, that the item of P11 that MK gathers in the purely personal space is not
"GG is gay" but rather "GG is MK's boyfriend." This item of P11 arguably is not
about GG any more than it is about MK. The sentence "GG is MK's boyfriend"
arguably is true if and only if the sentence "MK is GG's boyfriend" also is true.'
89
Such "boyfriend" P11 seems to be about both MK and GG or, perhaps more
accurately, about the relationship between MK and GG. "Boyfriend" P11 pertains to
MK and GG as members of a couple or dyad with romantic and presumably sexual
connotations rather than to MK and GG as individuals. As long as such "boyfriend"
P11 remains purely personal, the Directive does not assign the P11 to an individual.
Thus, within the purely personal space, the Directive appears to allow for the
possibility of relational P11 that is shared between or among people and is not subject
to individual consensual control.
""See DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 3.2.
'85 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
'86 See supra Part 2.
117 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. I I1.
188 See supra Part 4.
'8' See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 396-397
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Matters will be quite different, however, if MK informs a website operator such
as an online travel agent that "GG is MK's boyfriend." The DP Directive then
would require the website operator to confront the question whether he or she now
possesses "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person" named
GG. The obvious answer would seem to be "yes." This means that under the
Directive the website operator would be deemed a controller with respect to PIH
about an individual named GG. Accordingly, the website operator would have to
identify a legal basis for collecting and using the P11, provide certain information to
GG, and grant GG a right to access and correct the P11. Moreover, because the P11
likely would be deemed "sensitive," it would be difficult for the website operator
lawfully to collect the information "GG is MK's boyfriend" from MK without
promptly obtaining GG's opt-in consent. What was P1H about a couple or a
relationship in the purely personal space becomes an item of "personal data" about
an individual and subject to individual consent under the Directive if and when
someone provides it to a third party outside the purely personal space. The nature
and subject matter of the P11 do not change, but as required by the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, the Directive transforms shared, relational "boyfriend" PH1
into "personal data" about two individuals subject to each individual's consensual
authority. Generalizing this point, the line that the Directive draws between the
purely personal space and the space that the Directive regulates functions as a
horizon or boundary that simultaneously marks the outer limits of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm's reach and acknowledges a reality of shared relationships
lying beyond that reach.
A possible objection to the argument thus far presented is that it depends heavily
on the rather unusual nature of "boyfriend" PHi and, in particular, "boyfriend" PH1
related to a same-sex couple. Isn't such dyadic or relational P1I exceptional? A
complete response to this question would take the argument too far afield, but the
short answer is that such PHI is not exceptional. A large majority of EU residents
presumably have or at one time had mothers and fathers about whom they hold
substantial amounts of PHI gathered in the context of purely personal activity,
including PHI specifically about the parent-child relationship. A great many EU
residents also hold PIH about their relationships with their sisters and brothers,
spouses, children, grandparents, cousins, nieces and nephews. Most-even the
attorneys-also hold PHI about relationships with close friends, and some hold PH1
about lovers. Many belong to unions, churches, political parties, and other social
organizations that generate and share PH! internally.'9 When I say "Pauline is my
mother," "Karolena is my niece," and "Holger is my first cousin once removed," I
am recording P11 about relationships that partially define and constitute my status as
a member of an extended family. Change the names and most, if not all, of the
readers of this Article could utter similar sentences recording PHl about family
members, close friends, lovers, poker buddies, or fellow members of the Rotary
'90 PI! related to membership in such an organization receives special treatment under the DP
Directive. The organization may collect and use sensitive Pil about its members for its own purposes
without consent provided the PII is not transferred to third parties. DP Directive, supra note 42, art.
8.2(d). In this respect, therefore, such an organization receives treatment similar to that accorded the
individual's "purely personal" life, which lies beyond the horizon of the Directive. See supra notes 184 to
187 and accompanying text.
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Club. Thus, there is nothing unusual about the type of relational PI1 that the
Directive implicitly acknowledges and exempts within the purely personal space.
Indeed, for most of us, such relational PI probably tells us more about who we
really are than do such institutional identifiers as an email address or a social
security number. Yet under the Directive, once relational PHI such as "Henry is my
friend" crosses the boundary line demarcating the purely personal, it becomes
"personal data" about individuals, and this is true whether it qualifies as ordinary or
sensitive. The individual's primary legal authority over either type of P11 is the
capacity to consent (or not) to its collection and use. This is precisely what one
would anticipate under a regime that reflects the post-Enlightenment paradigm and
reinforces it by implementing it into law.
By drawing a line between the unregulated purely personal social reality and the
regulated reality of "personal data," EU legislators seem to imply that it would be
inappropriate, if not impossible, to impose on the purely personal reality the
paradigmatic requirements that each item of P11 be assigned to at least one individual
and that the individual exercise consensual authority over collection and use of that
P11. In this respect, the unregulated purely personal reality poses a challenge to the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, suggesting that something about who and what we are
qua participants in the purely personal reality escapes the paradigm's effort to
explain and justify human action in terms of individuals consenting to trade in
markets overseen by bureaucracies. Two boyfriends, for example, share P11 in the
intimacy of the purely personal space. They do not trade PHl with one another as
individuals in a market. The precepts about trust, disclosure, discretion, and mutual
respect governing their use of relational P11 presumably stem from their shared
vision of what it means to be good boyfriends and not from the principles of market
behavior, the DP Directive, or the right to privacy.i 9' These brief comments are
intended to draw attention to the post-Enlightenment paradigm's limitations and thus
raise the possibility that an alternative paradigm might provide a more adequate
explanation and justification of human action in the purely personal space. One
candidate, of course, would be the older Aristotelian teleological paradigm, which
assumed not that people are individuals but rather that a person's relationships to
other people, e.g., family, friends, and lovers, constitute the person as who he or she
is and help to define the ends that he or she should pursue in concert with others.' 92
The question whether the older paradigm in fact provides a more adequate account
of the purely personal space excluded by the Directive is beyond the scope of this
Article as is the larger and more difficult question whether one could use the older
paradigm to construct an adequate alternative account of the realm of individuals and
individual consent that the Directive does regulate.
B. Ambivalence Towards PH: Markets & Fundamental Rights
In Part 11, this Article noted that the U.S. internet privacy regime, which reflects
the post-Enlightenment paradigm, reveals the individual's deep ambivalence toward
'9'See also Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 397-398 (a person who misuses his boyfriend's P11 will be
criticized as a bad boyfriend and not for making a bad deal in the market).
11
2 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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his or her PII and its privacy. 93 On the one hand, the regime signals that individuals
place a high value on information privacy and experience considerable anxiety about
protecting P11. On the other hand, the regime ensures that the individual can trade
P11 in a market to the highest bidder. The EU internet privacy regime reflects this
same ambivalence by declaring that the privacy of P11 is a fundamental right
requiring specialized administrative oversight and at the same time promoting free
movement of Pl1 throughout the EU in a regulated market.
As previously noted, the DP Directive repeatedly declares that its purpose is to
protect the "fundamental" or "basic" rights of individuals, particularly the right to
privacy in regard to collection and use of Pil1. 94 The Directive does not, of course,
purport to explain how EU legislators knew that this particular right exists or that it
qualifies as fundamental and/or basic. According to the Directive, the authority for
the assertion that such a right exists is pre-existing European treaty law:
the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,
which is recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the
general principles of [European] Community law.1
95
Article 8 of the European Convention states-also without explanation or
argument-that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence."' 96 The Directive does not explain how or why
the fundamental right to privacy of PH1 derives from this "right to respect for...
private and family life." A legal regime could pay significant respect to a person's
"private and family life," covering such areas as sexual activity, child rearing, and
religious practices, while providing little or no special legal protection for PII.
Moreover, it is not clear how the asserted right to respect for private and family life
squares with the DP Directive's exclusion of PHl held in the purely personal space,
which presumably comprises much of private and family life.
The DP Directive also cites as a source for the fundamental right to privacy of
PH1 the Council of Europe's 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (DP Convention).' 97 The DP
Convention declares that its purpose is "to secure in the territory of each Party for
every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to
automatic processing of personal data relating to him ('data protection')."' 98 Thus,
'
93 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
195 DP Directive, supra note 42, recital 10.
"Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 8(1) (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. For a
discussion of the Convention, see Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-04 to 10-06.
197 DP Directive, supra note 42, recital II. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Jan. 28. 1981), available at
http://conventions.coe.intfTreaty/en/Treaties/html/108.htm [hereinafter Data Protection Convention]. For
a discussion of the Data Protection Convention, see Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-07 to 10-01.
"9" Data Protection Convention, supra note 197, art. I.
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the DP Convention provides a clearer source for the DP Directive's assertion that
individuals have a fundamental right to privacy of P11. Not surprisingly, however,
the DP Convention also does not explain how the Council of Europe determined that
there is such a fundamental right or what its scope might be. Indeed, if the Council
of Europe were a court, one would say that the assertion of a fundamental right to
privacy of P1I is ipse dixit. There is such a fundamental right because the Council of
Europe says there is, and in case we are still not convinced, EU legislators repeat the
Council of Europe's assertion several times in the DP Directive.
Alasdair Maclntyre has argued that "there are no [human or natural] rights, and
belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns."'199 Recognizing that he
might be accused of making a very controversial point rather "bluntly," he indicates
that "best reason" for concluding that there are no human or natural rights is that
"every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has
failed."200 It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate MacIntyre's arguments201
for this claim.202 His position is, however, consistent with a central tenet of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, i.e., that neither the old teleological paradigm nor its
proposed Enlightenment successors such as Kantianism and utilitarianism provides
us with a true and adequate theory of human nature and moral life. Thus, assuming
claims about natural or fundamental rights are essentially moral claims, it follows
that we lack a true theory to support them. 203  Accordingly, under the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, such rights claims are rooted in and will reflect each
individual's private values.
The view that rights claims stem from private values does not entail the
conclusion that such claims serve no purpose. Maclntyre characterizes them as
"moral fictions,' '2°4 and he draws attention to two purposes that they serve. The first
is to reinforce the post-Enlightenment paradigm's tenet that the social world consists
of individuals interacting and competing with one another. Such individuals are
understood as bearers of rights,205 and in this respect the DP Directive's repeated
references to fundamental rights are simply the flip side of the Directive's stress on
privacy as a characteristic-a "right" -- of the individual. According to Maclntyre:
[t]he arrival upon the social scene of conceptions of right, attaching to and
exercised by individuals, as a fundamental moral quasilegal concept...
always signals some measure of loss of or repudiation of some previous
'99 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 69.
200 Id. (emphasis in original).
2"1 For Maclntyre's key arguments, see id. at 66-71.
202 For an interesting discussion of the critical literature on rights discourse covering theorists from
Leo Strauss to Macintyre, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, see Thomas J. L Haskell, The Curious
Persistence of Rights Talk in tihe Age of Interpretation,'74 J. AM. HIsT. 984 (1987).
2"As Professor Haskell notes, "talk [about rights] implies something highly controversial: the
existence of an objective moral order accessible to reason. To be conscious of a right is at least tacitly to
lay claim to a kind of knowledge that is not merely personal and subjective but impersonal and objective."
Id. at 984. Although Haskell appears to concede the epistemological premise of Maclntyre's argument, he
criticizes Maclntyre's conclusion, id. at 1001-1002, and unlike Maclntyre he appears to be satisfied with
a theory of rights that is "without deep epistemological foundations" in which rights are "conventional
and historical in character." id. at 1008.
204 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 70.
2
05 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 361.
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social solidarity. Rights are claimed against some other person or
persons; they are invoked when and insofar as those others appear as
threats.2" 6
One ordinarily would not say, for example, that my hypothetical boyfriend and I
have rights against one another with respect to use of intimate information that we
share about one another,2 °7 but one typically would say that each of us has a right to
protection against a website operator who threatens to misuse that same information.
The claim that I have a right against threats by a third party reinforces my
understanding of myself as the sort of entity that can possess such rights, i.e., an
individual.
The second purpose that moral fictions such as claims about fundamental rights
serve is rhetorical. They are, according to Macintyre, a form of utterance through
which people express indignation at and protest against alleged wrongs.20 8 Claims
about rights provide an apparently neutral theoretical language that "serves to
conceal behind the masks of morality what are in fact the preferences of arbitrary
will and desire., 20 9 Thus, for example, when A says "every person has a right to
privacy," in practice A typically means that A wants to charge B a higher price for
P11; or A wants B to collect, use, and transfer P1H only in specified ways and at B's
expense; or A wants C, a public official, to interfere with B's collection and use of
A's P11. A couches her personal wishes or desires in the language of rights because
that language seems to provide a moral reason for giving A what she wishes or
desires-she has a right to it. Macintyre describes as "moral" such fictions as
fundamental rights precisely because they allow us to believe or pretend that we are
engaging in a reasoned moral discussion rather than a shouting match about who
took what from whom or who wants what from whom.
The shouting match and the endless struggle over who gets what are central
elements of our actual situation as interpreted by the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Our moral beliefs are said to stem from private values lying beyond rational dispute,
but not beyond vehement disagreement. Thus, there is a constant potential for
conflict between individuals viewed as holders of private, potentially irreconcilable
values. Dressing up claims about values as assertions about "fundamental rights"
may serve to mask the irresolvable nature of the underlying conflict at least for those
such as EU legislators who apparently claim to know which statements about private
values really are assertions about rights and which of those rights really are
fundamental. Such masking may in turn help to prevent the dissolution of the social
fabric into Hobbesian anarchy. 21 ° Assuming for the sake of argument that there is
merit to this account of the function of discourse about rights under the post-
2
16 MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS, supra note 12, at 184-85 (emphasis in original).
207 Rather than characterizing boyfriends as having rights against one another, a more plausible
approach would be to say that one characteristic of a good boyfriend is that he displays the virtues of
discretion and respect in his use of intimate P11 and thus deserves to be trusted with it.
2o8 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 71.
209id.
240 For a further application of this line of argument to the EU's information-privacy regime, see
infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
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Enlightenment paradigm, 21' it follows that the steady drumbeat of references in the
DP Directive to the fundamental right to privacy can be understood as, among other
things, an example of post-Enlightenment rhetoric asserting that an undefined "we"
vehemently, if arbitrarily, will and desire restrictions on collection and use of P1t.
The issue of who this "we" is will be taken up in Part IV.C.2, where it will be argued
that the rhetoric of fundamental rights, which purports to support and protect the
individual's "private life," also in fact supports the authority of bureaucracies to
administer and oversee most significant decisions affecting the individual's PII.
Competing with the rhetoric in the DP Directive about protecting fundamental
privacy rights are numerous references to the objective of establishing and
maintaining an "internal market" in which P11 can circulate freely around the
European Community. EU legislators adopted the Directive21 2 under Article I 00a
(now Article 95) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty),
which calls for adoption of "measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 2 13 According
to the EC Treaty, the "internal market [is] characterized by the abolition, as between
Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital." 2t4 Thus, EU legislators viewed the Directive as one of many pieces of
legislation designed to eliminate barriers to commerce in all forms between and
among the Member States. t 5 In the language of the Directive, "the establishment
and functioning of an internal market ... require ... that personal data should be
able to flow freely from one Member State to another. ' 2t 6
The concern that EU legislators expressed about interference with the free flow
of P11 in the EU market was not speculative. It arose at least in part because the
2. A proponent of the fundamental right to privacy could, of course, dispute the intellectual
underpinnings of the post-Enlightenment paradigm. She first would have to revive and repair either the
older teleological paradigm or one of the Enlightenment's proposed replacements, e.g., Kantian moral
theory or utilitarianism. She then would have to show that the revived and repaired moral theory entails
the conclusion that there is a fundamental right to privacy. Both efforts presumably confront significant
hurdles since, if Maclntyre is correct, people have pursued them for hundreds of years without success.
The point, however, is not that such efforts are doomed to fail but that we are under no obligation to
presume that they will succeed. Rather, it seems reasonable to treat claims about fundamental rights
skeptically and to focus on their rhetorical function, which they presumably retain whether or not they
have a sound foundation in moral theory. For some concluding comments on these issues, see infra Part
VI.
212 DP Directive, supra note 42 ("Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
and in particular Article 100a thereof...").21
3 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Nice Consolidated Version), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 33 art. 95(l) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Article 100a was renumbered Article 95 by the Treaty
of Amsterdam. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, art. 95.
214 EC Treaty, supra note 213, art. 3(l)(c). For a brief discussion of the rationale for the "internal
market," see GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 10, 13, 14
(2d ed. 2002). For a more detailed discussion of the internal market, see P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE
TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 171-224 (8th ed. 2004).
2"5 See BERMANN, supra note 214, at 14 (listing among the areas in which the EC has adopted
internal market legislation "banking, insurance and securities regulation, transport, intellectual property,
telecommunications, taxation and public procurement").
2"6 DP Directive, supra note 42, recital 3.
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French national data protection authority 217 had at one point decided to prohibit
Fiat's French subsidiary from transferring PH! about Fiat's French personnel to Fiat's
main office in Italy, thus interfering with Fiat's business operations.218  The DP
Directive does not mention the Fiat matter by name but the Directive clearly was
intended to address the type of problem posed by the French decision. As the
Directive states:
the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of
individuals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of
personal data afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission
of such data from the territory of one Member State to that of another
Member State; [and] this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle
to the pursuit of a number of economic activities at Community level
[and] distort competition .... 219
According to the Directive, "in order to remove the obstacles to flows of
personal data, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with
regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent in all Member States...
[and European] Community action to approximate those laws is therefore
needed.22° Once the Community "approximates" national laws by requiring each
Member State to implement the Directive, those laws will provide "equivalent
protection . . . [and] Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free
movement -between them of personal data .... ,,221 The Directive characterizes the
goal of establishing equivalent levels of data protection throughout the EU as "vital
to the internal market. 222
The DP Directive does not simply pay lip service to the need for a functioning
market in which P11 can flow without legal impediments throughout the EU. Many
of the substantive provisions of the Directive appear to reflect the intent to promote
and sustain such a market. As discussed at some length in Part Ill of this Article, the
Directive places some control over an individual's PHI in the hands of the individual
himself or herself by, for example, establishing consent as one of the recognized
legal bases for collection and use of P1l. 223 Thus, within limits, the individual can
consent to trade his or her PHl in the market for a price and on terms the individual
considers acceptable. Moreover, within limits, the Directive authorizes website
operators to collect and use an individual's ordinary PHl for the website operator's
own business purposes without the individual's consent.224 Once P1 is lawfully
collected, a website operator may transfer it throughout the EU's internal market
2 7 The French national data protection authority, which was created in 1978, is known as the
Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertis or CNIL. The CNIL now serves as France's
DPSA under the DP Directive. See generally DECREE No. 2005-5309 of Oct. 20, 2005, Journal Officiel
de la Republique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 22, 2005, p. 16769. For information
about the CNIL and its current activities, see The CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=43
2I1 Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-03.
2 19 DP Directive, supra note 42, recital 7.
2 1d recital 8.
221 Id. recital 9.
222 Id. recital 8.
223 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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without legal obstacles, assuming all parties comply with the Directive. Under
certain conditions, a website operator can even trade or otherwise transfer an
individual's P11 to a business or other data controller in a non-EU country without
'the individual's consent. 25 The Directive actively discourages collection, use, and
trading of PII in the market for business purposes only if the PII falls into one of the
categories deemed sensitive.226 And as noted above,227 those categories are defined
by law and not by the individual, thus providing businesses with a predictable legal
environment in which to collect, use, and trade P11.
One might reply that the DP Directive actually imposes a range of restrictions
on the uses that a website operator may make of an individual's P11 in the market
once the P11 has been collected legitimately. As discussed above,228 the Directive
requires all data controllers to (I)obtain a license from, or register with, a DPSA;
(2) satisfy various "data quality" requirements; (3) provide a variety of information
to the individual whose P11 is to be collected; (4) grant the individual rights of access
and correction; and (5) adopt security measures to protect PII. These requirements
limit trading of P11 within the market. Thus, it is misleading to suggest that the
Directive promotes the market interests of website operators in collecting, using and
trading Pll at the expense of the individual's strong desire for privacy.
The difficulty with this reply is that it misses the point. No one would deny that
the DP Directive imposes limits on collection, use, and trading of P11 within the
market. The point, rather, is that the regime presupposes the existence of a market
for P11 that is integral to the broader internal market and the Directive promotes the
operation of that P11 market by establishing the ground rules for its operation. The
Directive thus makes individuals and their P11 available to serve the needs of the
market. And as something that can be traded in a market, each item of P11 becomes
a commodity with a price.2 29 The question whether there should be a P11 market,
however regulated, is not and cannot be raised seriously, because the market is the
element of the post-Enlightenment paradigm through which we understand how
individuals interact to pursue their objectives as defined by their values.230 Indeed,
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, it is all but unthinkable that individuals
would not be able to trade P11 in a market. The P11 market is, therefore, a premise of
the DP Directive, and just as the P11 market is crucial to the internal market, so the
Directive that regulates the P11 market is "vital to the internal market. 23'
As one would expect under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, which ties
individuals firmly to markets in which they pursue their interests, circulation of PI
as a commodity is vital not only to the EU's internal market but also to the
individual. This is because the individual can acquire an identity in the electronic
225 
See supra Part III.B.3.226
See supra Part III.B.2.
227 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
228See supra Part III.C.
229 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 385. For a brief discussion of the distinctive features of
information as a form of property that parties can trade, see MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 380-8 1.231 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 386-88 (showing that the U.S. Internet privacy regime both
presumes a market for P1I and promotes the operation of that market).
23 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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market, an identity as this particular individual, only by trading his or her P11. To
participate in a market transaction at a distance, the individual must be willing and
able to identify himself or herself to a counterparty who otherwise would not know
with whom he/she/it is dealing. The individual does this by supplying PH1 to the
counterparty. If I do not provide such information as a name, street address, email
address, and credit card number, Amazon.UK cannot know that I am the particular
individual who wants to buy the latest Paul Russell novel and Amazon.UK
presumably cannot and will not sell it to me. In general, if I refuse to trade my P11
within the market, I will lose my identity in the market.232 I will render myself
indistinguishable from other individuals and thus cease to be a distinct individual-
at least from the market's perspective. Seen in this light, the DP Directive provides a
legal framework within which individuals can disseminate P1 to establish their
identities in the market, and the market that circulates PH1 among individuals and
organizations plays an essential role in the establishment of individual identity-as
one would expect under the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
It should now be clear in what sense the DP Directive reflects the basic
ambivalence toward PH1 and its privacy that is a hallmark of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm. A premise of the Directive is that individuals place, or should place, a
high value on the privacy of P11, and the Directive rhetorically endorses this
evaluation by declaring that the privacy of P1H is a fundamental right. At the same
time, the Directive facilitates trading of PH1 by presupposing and promoting a market
for Pil. The Directive seeks to protect the privacy of P11 that defines who I am as
this individual by enabling me to trade that PH1 as a commodity. In exchange for my
P11 and other items that I value, I can obtain other commodities in the market that I
value more.
The DP Directive's ambivalence toward PH1 and its privacy has roots in the
Directive's treatment of personal identity. In the Directive's parlance, I am a "data
subject., 233 But who or what exactly is a data subject? One plausible approach to
that question would be to list those items of PHl or personal data that are predicates
of the subject. But the predicates that one typically would list-i.e., name, sex, age,
height, weight, and so forth-are not essential to the data subject qua data subject
because they will differ from subject to subject and in many instances from time to
time with respect to particular subjects. That which subsists through these
predicates, the identity of the "I" that is the underlying data subject, seems to escape
such predication and thus in an important sense lies beyond description. Perhaps
what can be said of the data subject is that it is a continuing potential to gather
predicates together into an individual. Beyond that continuing potential, the data
232 Researchers continue to develop technologies that may facilitate online trading without requiring
parties to exchange such sensitive P1I as credit card information. See Joris Evers, IBM Donates New
Privacy Tool to Open-Source, available at http://news.com.com /2100-0029_3-3153625.html. Currently,
such technologies allow a trusted third party such as a credit card company to hold the sensitive
information and operate as a go-between for the parties. Id. Such trusted-third-party systems presume, of
course, that the individual is willing to supply P11 to the third party. Thus, the individual still must
surrender PH1 to someone in the market in order for an electronic transaction to unfold.233 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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subject arguably is nothing at all and it vanishes into the realm of silence, the realm
of that about which nothing more can be said.
The data subject that appears in the DP Directive accurately reflects certain
distinctively modem accounts of personal identity or the individual self that emerge
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm.234 As Macintyre has written, this "self
which has no necessary social content and no necessary social identity can . . . be
anything, can assume any role or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself
nothing. '235 The data subject that is in and for itself nothing is the "I" that or whom
the Directive protects. To this "I" who is nothing, P11 is at once inessential and
necessary. P11 tells us nothing about the underlying data subject and therefore is
inessential. It can be alienated, acquired, and changed like a suit of clothes. I can
treat it as a commodity and sell it to the highest bidder or on the best terms. On the
other hand, without my P11, I am little more than a continuing potential to be
something, and this is tantamount to being nothing.236 Any threat to my P11 is a
threat to what distinguishes me from all other data subjects and thus to my identity.
Hence, I am likely to be deeply concerned about such threats. My strong desire to
protect my P11 against such threats finds voice in the assertion of a fundamental right
to information privacy. Ambivalence to P11 is thus built into the structure of the
relationship between the data subject-the "I' -and his or her P11.
One might respond-reasonably-that the DP Directive is simply a law and so
it is unfair to elicit from the Directive a philosophy of identity or the human self.
But it is a thesis of this Article that the Directive reflects and reinforces a particular
type of philosophy, or more accurately, a particular paradigmatic way of seeing
human nature and moral life that is characteristic of our modem condition. Seen
from this perspective, it is not an accident that the Directive treats the human self as
a numinous, vanishing individual data subject that fears to lose P11 and yet needs to
trade P11 as a commodity in the market. Policy pronouncements by the DPSA
Working Party tend to confirm this account of the Directive's approach to personal
identity. The DPSAs have argued that a person should be able to use an electronic
market anonymously, just as a person may purchase anonymously from the "vendor
1)237
in a small corner shop [who] is not interested in the identity of his customer ....
According to the DPSAs, "the possibility of remaining anonymous is essential if the
fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression are to be maintained in
cyberspace., 238 Thus, for the DPSAs, anonymity represents a desirable policy goal
and perhaps even an ideal form of personal privacy, at least on the internet. This
suggests, however, that for the DPSAs, personal privacy may be equivalent in certain
circumstances to namelessness or even identitylessness, since mere namelessness
234 See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 32 (discussing the parallels between the
accounts of the individual self offered by Jean-Paul Sartre and Irving Goffmann) and 115-17 (discussing
the parallels between the accounts offered by Goffmann and Friedrich Nietzsche).
23 Id. at 32.2 31 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 364-65 (discussing the anxiety that the individual would be
likely to feel with loss of control over P11).237 See DPSA Working Party, Recommendation 3/97, Anonymity on the Internet, XV D /5022/97
Final (Dec. 3, 1997), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1997/wp6-en.pdf.238 Id. at 5.
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may not suffice to preserve anonymity in the electronic environment. Thus, an ideal
form of privacy for me would be to enter the electronic market without my PII as a
naked data subject, a naked "1," the primary characteristic of which is that it is
someone or something about whom/which nothing personal can be said. This in turn
seems to imply that, according to the DPSA Working Party, my fundamental right to
privacy includes a right to be no one. As no one in particular, I could be anyone. To
paraphrase Macintyre, I could assume any role or point of view, because, as an
anonymous data subject, I am in essence nothing. Through discussions such as this
one of anonymity as a policy goal, the DPSA Working Party shows that the
Directive reflects the rudiments of a philosophy of personal identity or the individual
self rooted in the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
If further evidence of the DP Directive's ambivalence to PHI and its privacy
were required, one need look no further than the Directive's treatment of PHI in the
"purely personal" space. As discussed above,239 the Directive recognizes but does
not regulate a space for purely personal activity in which people hold and use PH1
about one another and their relationships. Such P11 is not treated as "personal data"
regulated by the Directive and therefore is not subject to individual consensual
control. Assuming the Directive adequately defines or formalizes the scope of the
fundamental right to information privacy, it would appear to follow that the
Directive, by excluding PIH in the purely personal space, signals that the fundamental
right does not cover such P11. Not surprisingly, this inference is consistent with the
post-Enlightenment paradigm's account of the individual as a bearer of rights.24 °
The person within the purely personal space is not presumed to be an individual
under the Directive and therefore would not be a bearer of rights, including the right
to information privacy. Moreover, assuming rights claims are a form of rhetoric, if
the Directive's assertion of a right to information privacy signals a strongly held
desire to protect P11, then the Directive's exclusion of P11 in the purely personal
space suggests that the desire to protect PH1 does not extend to PH1 in the purely
personal space. One might say that the more personal and intimate the information,
the less its significance from the perspective of the Directive. PH1 becomes legally
significant and a fit subject of fundamental rights only when it leaves the purely
personal space and enters the market.
These remarks about the purely personal space recognized by the DP Directive
pose a challenge to the post-Enlightenment paradigm. Insofar as a person acts
within the purely personal space, holding PlH about family, friends, lovers, and so
forth, the person apparently does not come into contact with the Pil market. By
trading PH! on the market, the person crosses the boundary line demarcating the
purely personal space. This means, however, that the Directive presumes that
relations between people within the purely personal space are not market relations.
Insofar as a relationship in the purely personal space evolves into a market
relationship, it apparently would drop out of the purely personal space and become
subject to the Directive. As discussed above 24 the post-Enlightenment paradigm
239See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
241See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text..
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seeks to explain and justify human action by reference to markets in which each
person, understood to be an individual, pursues his or her own interests according to
his or her own values. The post-Enlightenment paradigm cannot adequately explain
and justify actions within the purely personal space via the analytical construct of the
market because by hypothesis the purely personal space comprises such non-market
relationships as family, friendship, and love. Yet the Directive appears to presume
that P11 will be safe within such relationships despite the absence of legal protection
for fundamental rights. To explain such iniimate relationships and justify treating
P11 as safe within them appears to require an alternative paradigm that does not rely
on the notion of rights-bearing individuals trading in markets. Developing such an
alternative is beyond the scope of this Article, but again it is worth noting that
exponents of the old Aristotelian paradigm offered alternative accounts of the
trusting relationship of people within a family that did not involve reference to a
market.242
C. Impersonality, Bureaucracy, and the Administration of Privacy
In Part II, this Article explained that the U.S. internet privacy regime, following
the post-Enlightenment paradigm, relies heavily on administrative bureaucracy to
counter the potential chaos of individual wills expressed in the market in the absence
of a shared vision of the good.243 Heavy reliance on bureaucracy is, not surprisingly,
a defining characteristic of the culture of bureaucratic individualism. As shown in
this Part, bureaucracy plays the same paradigmatic role under the EU internet
privacy regime. The persuasiveness of this claim depends on, among other things,
what one means by the term "bureaucracy." The appropriate starting point for a
discussion of bureaucratic organization is the work of Max Weber.244 According to
Talcott Parsons, for Weber a bureaucracy is
an organization devoted to what is from the point of view of the
participants an impersonal end. It is based on a type of division of labor
which involves specialization in terms of clearly differentiated functions,
divided according to technical criteria, with a corresponding division of
authority hierarchically organized, heading up to a central organ, and
specialized technical qualifications on the part of the participants. The
role of each participant is conceived of as an "office" where he acts by
242 For Aristotle's discussion of the family, see ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 18-89 (Ernest Barker trans.,
1948). For a later discussion along the same lines, see GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT I 10 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821).243 See supra Part II.
244 Maclntyre has stated that his account of the role of bureaucracy is indebted to the work of Weber.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 86, 109. In the words of Professor Gorski, "[elven today,
Weber's definition [of bureaucracy] still serves as the starting point for most work on the subject." Philip
S. Gorski, The Protestant Ethic and the Bureaucratic Revolution: Ascetic Protestantism and
Administrative Rationalization in Early Modern Europe, in MAX WEBER'S ECONOMYAND SOCnI.7': A
CRITICAL COMPANION 267, 267 (Charles Camic et al. eds., 2005). In a similar vein, after identifying a
number of weaknesses in Weber's analysis of authority, including his account of bureaucracy, Talcott
Parsons concluded "[pirobably Weber's analysis of authority even as it stands constitutes the most highly
developed and broadly applicable conceptual scheme in any comparable field which is available, not only
in the specifically sociological literature, but in that of social science as a whole." Introduction to MAX
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 77 (Talcott Parsons ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1947).
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virtue of the authority vested in the office and not of his personal
influence. 45
As Weber states, within a bureaucracy, "[i]ndividual performances are
allocated to functionaries who have specialized training and who by
constant practice increase their expertise. 'Objective' discharge of
business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable
rules and 'without regard for persons.' 2 46  As a result of detailed studies of
authority structures in various periods of human history,247 Weber concluded that
bureaucracy in the sense described has become the paradigmatic modem structure of
authority and power in both the private and public sectors. 48 Thus, assuming Weber
is broadly correct,249 it would be surprising if a law such as the DP Directive, which
relies heavily on administrative oversight, did not equate administration with
impersonal, hierarchically organized, technically specialized bureaucracy.
As discussed in the following parts, the DP Directive reflects and reinforces the
culture of bureaucratic (in Weber's sense) individualism in at least two respects.
First, under the Directive, the bureaucratic structures that run modem business
organizations channel and coordinate potentially chaotic values that different
individuals assign to their interests and objectives, including the privacy of their P11,
into a relatively orderly system . 5  Second, and more importantly in the EU context,
the Directive establishes public bureaucracies-i.e., the DPSAs-to administer the
operation of the P11 market, set many of the terms according to which a website
operator may collect and use P11, and thereby lessen the threat of conflict and chaos
that arises when individuals and business organizations deal with one another
directly.25' In each of these respects, under the Directive, the impersonal
bureaucracy proves to be a necessary condition for the protection of P11 that
constitutes the personal identity of the individual. Calls for protection of the
individual's fundamental right to privacy function as justifications for the expansion
of bureaucratic control and authority. The DP Directive thus clearly reflects and
reinforces the culture of bureaucratic individualism that lies at the core of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm.
2 45 
TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 506 (2d ed. 1949).
246 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 975 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968)
(emphasis in original).24 7 For one of Weber's discussions of his research in this area, see id. at 212-301.
24 See id. at 223. For a summary of Weber's views on the importance of bureaucracy in a modern
economy, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
WRITINGS OF MARX, DURKHEIM AND MAX WEBER 158-60 (1971).
249 While recognizing the central importance of Weber's work, Maclntyre has noted that "Weber's
account of bureaucracy notoriously has many flaws." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 86.
For critical comments on Weber, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Social Science Methodology as the Ideology
of Bureaucratic Authorit,, in THE MACINTYRE READER 53, 64-67 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998). For more
biting criticisms, see Rodney Stark, SSSR Presidential Address, 2004: Putting an End to Ancestor
Worship, 43 J. SCI. STUD. OF REL. 465, 465-68 (2004). A critical examination of the extensive literature
on Weber is beyond the scope of this Article.
250 See infra Part IV.C. 1.
"' See infra Part IV.C.2.
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I. Privacy and the Bureaucratic Business Organization
Given the importance of the DPSAs and, therefore, of public bureaucracies in
the operation of the DP Directive, it would be easy to overlook the fact that the
bureaucracies with which individuals ordinarily deal in the market for P11 are those
that run businesses such as commercial websites.252 There are two important pieces
of evidence indicating that the EU legislators who adopted the DP Directive
expected that such businesses would be bureaucratically organized. First, the term
"data controller" may be used to refer not only to a business organization as a whole
that controls items of P11 but also to the person or people within the organization
who determine(s) the purposes and means for collecting and using P1. 253 In this
sense, the term "data controller" denotes an office within an organization, an office
that the Directive presumes will ordinarily stand below the offices of the people who
run the organization but above the offices of people who actually collect and/or use
P11 on the organization's behalf. The officeholders below the data controller(s) are
expected to follow any instructions issued by the data controller(s), just as the data
controller(s) must seek to implement the business objectives defined by superior
officials, if any, within the bureaucratic hierarchy.254
Second, as discussed briefly above,255 the DP Directive grants an organization
the legal right to establish a special office-that of the "data protection official"--
within its bureaucratic hierarchy. Among other things, a data protection official will
be responsible "for ensuring in an independent manner the internal application of the
national provisions taken pursuant to th[e] Directive." 256 Thus, in an organization
that elects to establish the office of "data protection official," the office-note the
Weberian language-should have at least some authority over all other offices
within the organization that collect and use P11, presumably including the office of
data controller. The Directive reinforces this requirement by stating that "a data
protection official, whether or not an employee of the controller, must be in a
position to exercise his functions in complete independence., 257 Thus, whatever the
data protection official's nominal position within the bureaucratic hierarchy, the data
protection official must be able to carry out the distinctive responsibilities of his or
her office independently of any commands that may originate at higher levels of the
bureaucracy. One might say that the official is required to stand at the apex of a
particular section of the bureaucracy overseeing the legality of all collection and use
of P11. Again, the Directive clearly presumes that other officials within the
bureaucratic hierarchy will, or at least should, do their bureaucratic duty and carry
252 According to Talcoti Parsons, for Weber the "principal distinguishing feature of the modem
Western economic order" is "'bureaucratic organization' in the service of pecuniary profit in a system of
market relations." PARSONS, supra note 245, at 508.25
1 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
254 In some organizations, the highest-ranking officials presumably are the data controller(s) because
those officials determine the purpose of and means for data collection and use.
255 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
256 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 18(2).
257 Id. recital 49.
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out the data protection official's instructions. 258  In light of the DP Directive's
treatment of the offices of data controller and data protection official, it seems clear
that EU legislators presumed that a website operator or other organization collecting
and using P11 ordinarily would be set up as a hierarchical structure of specialized
offices, i.e., a bureaucracy.
Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the bureaucratically organized website
operator plays a crucial role in the electronic market for P1. 259 According to the
paradigm, each individual will assign a value to his or her PHl within the market.
One factor in the individual's evaluation presumably will be his or her privacy
preferences. Multiple, conflicting individual values could lead to a situation in
which there are as many different market values for an item or collection of P11 as
there are individuals operating within the market. Consequently, the market for PH!
would be confusing and potentially chaotic, perhaps discouraging some people from
trading and obtaining an acceptable value for their P11. In dealing with individual
consumers, a bureaucratically organized website operator such as Amazon.UK will
channel and coordinate these individual values into a more or less uniform price
structure for P11, a common set of terms and conditions under which all interested
individuals submit PHI to Amazon.UK in exchange for goods, services, and other
benefits.260 For its part, Amazon.UK will collect and use the individual's PH1 to
further Amazon.UK's organizational interests, which might include increasing sales,
profits, market share, share value, and so forth.
Amazon.UK does not, of course, have an entirely free hand in setting the price
for P11. Amazon.UK has to compete in the market for P1I with other website
operators pursuing their organizational interests. Over time, one might expect
Amazon.UK and comparable website operators to offer relatively similar prices and
terms for P11, thereby further channeling and coordinating the welter of individual
values into an orderly market with relatively uniform prices and other terms. Thus,
as the post-Enlightenment paradigm requires, bureaucratic business organizations
operating through the market tend to counteract the chaos that appears to be
inevitable when individuals pursue individual objectives according to individual
values without a shared vision of the good. The DP Directive reinforces this
arrangement by providing legal support for individual consent within the market
while at the same time expressly authorizing bureaucratic business organizations
such as website operators to collect and use P11 for their own purposes. It should be
emphasized that the point here is not to denigrate the role of bureaucratically
organized website operators in the PHl market. It is hardly a criticism to say that
Amazon.UK collects and uses PH1 in Amazon.UK's interests. Why else would
Amazon.UK collect and use P11? The point is rather to identify the crucial role of
25 8 As Reinhard Bendix wrote, "[tihe ideal official... must put his sense of duty above his personal
opinion, and his ability to do this well is ideally part of his professional ethic." REINHARD BENDIX, MAX
WEBER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 440 (1977).259 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 403-05 (discussing the role of the bureaucratically organized
website operator under U.S. privacy law).
2", For the current version of the privacy policy on Amazon's United Kingdom website, see
http://www.amazon.co.uk/ (follow "HELP" hyperlink; then follow "'Privacy Notice" hyperlink) (last
visited March 20, 2007).
[Vol. 14
TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS?
the business organizational bureaucracy under the DP Directive as an institution that
channels and coordinates individual values within the P11 market.
If Reinhardt Bendix is correct that for Weber bureaucratic "organizations
operate more efficiently than alternative systems of administration and . . . they
increase their efficiency to the extent that they 'depersonalize' the execution of
official tasks,"26' then one would expect a bureaucratic business organization to
depersonalize tasks related to collection and use of PII. The organization would, in
other words, seek to adopt an impersonal approach to personal information. Using
(or misusing) someone's P11 for personal reasons would violate the bureaucratic
principle of depersonalization. So, for example, if Amazon.UK collects the
information that I like to read gay-themed novels, Amazon.UK does so not because
it or its employees have a prurient or malign interest in my sexual orientation but
because collecting such information will help Amazon.UK to achieve its impersonal
organizational goals. 262 Amazon.UK can, for example, use my P11 to target me with
announcements about the publication of new gay-themed novels, and thereby solicit
new orders. Thus, Amazon.UK's use of my P11 reflects a business interest and not a
personal interest on the part of the organization or its officials. Modem data
processing technology actually assists in depersonalizing bureaucratic control over
P11 by removing human beings and their personal interests from most aspects of data
collection and use, particularly in the field of electronic commerce. 63 In theory, the
only person at Amazon.UK who needs to know anything about me might be the one
who packs my books in a box bearing my name and address.
The DP Directive reinforces the bureaucratic principle of depersonalization,
stating that "[alny person acting under the authority of the controller . . . who has
access to personal data must not process them except on instructions from the
controller, unless he is required to do so by law." 264 Thus, the data controller within
an organization dictates the organization's official reasons and rules for collecting
and using P11. Every company official involved in such collection and use is
bureaucratically subordinate to the data controller and by law must adhere to the data
controller's instructions, eschewing any unofficial (read: personal) interest in PI1 or
its use. The Directive thus presumes and reinforces a system in which, ideally, the
impersonal business bureaucracy wields impersonal data processing technology to
collect and use Pil and thereby channels and coordinates the personal and private
values and objectives of individuals in the market to further the business's interests.
Without the activities of the impersonal bureaucracy, chaos might result, according
to the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
261 BENDIX, supra note 258, at 427. For a discussion of the relative strengths of bureaucratic
organizational structures over historical alternatives, see id. at 426-30.262 These organizational goals would include the business purposes that the DP Directive recognizes,
within limits, as a legitimate basis for collecting and using P11, even without the individual's consent. See
supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
263 Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 404.
2"64 DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 16.
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2. Privacy and Public Administration
In the preceding Part, the discussion focused on the significant role of private
bureaucratic organizations under the EU internet privacy regime and showed how
that role is what one would expect in a world that reflects the post-Enlightenment
paradigm. This initial focus on private bureaucratic organizations resulted in part
from the fact that their role easily might be overlooked in a discussion of the EU
regime. There is, however, another set of bureaucratic organizations established by
the EU regime that it would be very difficult to overlook, namely the DPSAs. These
organizations are tasked with administering the national laws implementing the DP
Directive in their respective Member States.2 65 One of the main arguments of this
Article has been that DPSAs play a central role, if not the central role, in the
operation of the EU regime and no further effort will be made here to demonstrate
that point. Rather, the purpose of the following discussion is to explore the
significance under the post-Enlightenment paradigm of the role that the DPSAs play.
As Alasdair Maclntyre argues, a principal function of the bureaucracy within the
culture of bureaucratic individualism is to "limit the free and arbitrary choices of
individuals. ' ' 266 The need for an institution that so limits individual choice arises
from the ever-present threat of disorder and chaos in a world where individual values
drive individual actions in the absence of a shared vision of the good. Based on the
discussion in Part IV.C.I, however, it would seem that bureaucratically structured
business organizations operating in a market may limit individual choice sufficiently
to eliminate or at least considerably reduce the threat of disorder and chaos. As a
result, there should be no need for a further layer of bureaucracy to oversee the
operation of the market. Yet it is absolutely clear that in the EU and other advanced
industrial regions and countries, one or more layers of public bureaucratic
administration do oversee the operation of most, if not all, markets and fields of
individual activity.267 In this respect, the decision to establish the DPSAs represents
a normal response by EU legislators to the emergence of the new market for P11.
Theorists of administrative law in the United States have attempted to explain
the connection between markets and public administrative bureaucracies by noting
that markets are presumed to malfunction. According to Professor Rabin,2 68 it is
possible to sort administrative agencies among different models depending upon the
type of presumed market malfunction that the agency was intended to address. For
purposes of this Article, two such models are relevant. The first, known as the
"policing model," was intended to respond to "certain 'excessively competitive'
[market] practices such as the manufacture of products that seriously endangered
265 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
266See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
267 There are, for example, more than 20 highly bureaucratic Directorates General in the European
Commission overseeing the operations of such diverse markets and fields as agriculture and rural
development, fisheries and maritime affairs, and transport and energy. For a current list of the
Commission's Policy Directorates General and Services, see European Commission Directorates-General
and Services, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs en.htm.
2'" Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
For a more detailed summary and discussion of Rabin's argument, see Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 377-
83.
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health and safety or the setting of rates that were particularly discriminatory." 269 The
agency's task under the policing model is to intervene in the market as necessary to
police such excessively competitive practices and thus deter them. When such
practices are deterred, the policing model presumes that the market will function
properly without further administrative intervention. In an earlier article on the U.S.
internet privacy regime, I argued that the FTC's approach to administering the
market for P11 follows the policing model.270 In effect, the FTC identified as
excessively competitive the practice of making false or misleading statements about
the extent of privacy protection on websites that collect P11. The FTC then took on
the task of deterring this practice, thereby promoting the trading of P11 within what is
presumed to be a properly functioning market in which an individual can sell P11 for
an appropriate price based on accurate information.
According to Rabin, in contrast to the policing model the "market-corrective
model" presumes that orderly markets require a "commitment to permanent market
stabilization activity by the ... government. 27' Occasional intervention as foreseen
by the policing model will not suffice. In the United States, particularly during the
New Deal era, an agency following the market-corrective model typically engaged in
"price-fixing, information-sharing and market-allocating schemes . ... ,272
Government assumed substantial responsibility for economic planning because, as
Professor Gifford remarked, "planning and supervision of growth are logical
outcomes of price and entry regulation., 273  The market-corrective model thus
presumes that even after all excessively competitive practices, including false and
misleading statements, unsafe products, and predatory pricing, have been deterred,
the market nevertheless will tend to produce unacceptable outcomes, perhaps
because of unequal bargaining power or for other reasons. 2 7' From the standpoint of
the market-corrective model, the market will continue to be unstable and disorderly
without constant administrative supervision.275 In this respect, the market-corrective
model reflects with even greater precision than the policing model the post-
Enlightenment paradigm's account of the need for public administrative
bureaucracies in the culture of bureaucratic individualism. Such bureaucracies
provide continuous assurance of order and stability in a potentially chaotic world of
individuals pursuing their own interests according to their own values.
Implicit in this discussion of the policing and market-corrective models is an
answer to the argument that private bureaucratic organizations such as website
operators could provide the order and stability that the post-Enlightenment paradigm
demands in a potentially chaotic world of individuals pursuing individual interests.
269 Rabin, supra note 268, at 1192.
"See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 383-94.
271 See Rabin, supra note 268, at 1192.
271id. at 1192.
273 Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68
MINN. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983).
171 See Rabin, supra note 268, at 1253 (market-corrective National Labor Relations Act "served as a
buffer against inequality of bargaining power in the labor market").
17'For an example of this kind of reasoning, see Nat'l Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 2 10-
218 (1943) (discussing the crucial role of the Federal Communications Commission in stabilizing the
market for radio frequencies).
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Both models appear to treat such private organizations, despite their complex
bureaucratic structures, as equivalent to individuals or natural persons competing in
the market.27 6 The policing model presumes that such organizations may engage in
overly aggressive market behavior such as deceptive advertising and thus must be
deterred by public bureaucracies such as the FTC.2 77 The market-corrective model
goes further and presumes that private bureaucratic organizations may produce
unacceptable outcomes even when they pursue their interests in a manner that is not
overly aggressive, entering into informed, wholly consensual agreements with other
organizations and individuals. The market-corrective model posits that a public
administrative agency-i.e., a bureaucracy-must continuously oversee such
practices as market entry, pricing, information sharing, resource use, and so forth in
order to prevent unacceptable outcomes and stave off possible market malfunction.
One might say that, although private bureaucratic organizations do help to produce
order and stability in markets, from the perspective of the policing and market-
corrective models, such organizations nevertheless are part of the problem rather
than the solution.
Professor Rabin developed his account of the distinction between the policing
model and the market-corrective model to help explain the evolution of
administrative law in the United States. There is no reason, however, why his
distinction cannot be used to illuminate the role of the DPSA in the PIH market under
the DP Directive. 278 Assuming that one can apply Rabin's distinction in the EU
context, it seems clear that the role of the DPSA goes well beyond mere policing of
excessively competitive practices. Indeed, the DP Directive wastes little space
identifying prohibited practices that the DPSA might police. Instead, as one would
expect under the market-corrective model, the DP Directive controls entry into the
market for Pit; 279 mandates the sharing of information with regulators and
consumers; 28° empowers the DPSA to apply such standards as fairness, adequacy,
legitimacy, and relevancy to set or influence the prices and terms according to which
PHl may be collected; 28 1 and generally regulates collection, use and trading of PHl as
a resource or commodity. Moreover, as one would expect under the market-
corrective model and as has been shown repeatedly in this Article, the DP Directive
limits the legal significance of individual consent, implying that individuals often
cannot be trusted to enter into transactions involving their PII because they may
agree to arrangements that are unacceptable even though freely entered into and fully
informed. To quote the summary of an earlier part of this Article, under the DP
2176 Corporate law adopts a similar approach. Corporations generally have legal personality, meaning
that for most purposes the law treats them in the same way that it treats living individuals. As Professor
Clark wrote, "[flor legal purposes, a corporation is almost as much an entity as a natural person."
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17 (1986).277 Not surprisingly, some scholars have argued that the market would deter such behavior without
the intervention of the FTC. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHj. L. REV.
47, 61-70 (1969).27
1 See Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 377-78 (discussing the use of Rabin's models as analytical tools
in the U.S. context).
171 See supra Part IICI.C.I.28
) See supra Part Ill.C.3
281 See supra notes 139 to 145 and accompanying text.
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Directive, "'consent is often unnecessary and never sufficient to legitimate collection
and use of Pll."
At this point in the argument, there would appear to be an obvious response.
The reason that consent is never sufficient under the DP Directive, the reason that
the Directive empowers the DPSA to intervene broadly in the market, is that EU
legislators believed information privacy to be a fundamental right, and they said so
repeatedly in the Directive.282 The market, if left to its own devices or regulated
lightly under the policing model, will tolerate and perhaps even encourage modes of
PHi collection and use that are unacceptable, even if all parties have consented,
precisely because those modes violate the fundamental rights of the individuals
concerned. The Directive follows the market-corrective model in order to ensure
that the P11 market receives the type of continuous supervision required to prevent
violations of fundamental rights that might occur under the policing model.
It would come as no surprise if EU officials cited the need to protect
fundamental rights as a justification for the EU's market-corrective approach.8 3
Such a justification would, however, provide further evidence that the EU regime
reflects the post-Enlightenment paradigm. As discussed above,284 Alasdair
Maclntyre has argued that assertions about human or fundamental rights are "moral
fictions" that mask arbitrary individual preferences, claims, and grievances in an
apparently neutral moral language. The preferences, claims, and grievances are
arbitrary, according to the post-Enlightenment paradigm, because there is assumed to
be no true account of the human good or lelos, no shared vision of the good, from
which one can derive a list of true moral and ethical precepts,285 including true
precepts about natural or fundamental rights. Consistent with Maclntyre's analysis,
the moral fiction that there is a fundamental right to information privacy performs at
least two important rhetorical functions in the argument justifying the DP Directive's
market-corrective approach. First, it asserts the moral superiority of the speaker's
position. He or she is articulating and promoting a fundamental right, and thus
anyone who questions the broad, market-corrective powers of the DPSA may be
accused of undermining fundamental rights. This rhetorical strategy tends to place
the moral underpinnings of the DP Directive and the DPSA's mission beyond
serious debate. Of course, one of the tenets of the post-Enlightenment paradigm is
that such moral claims are in fact beyond reasoned debate and therefore ultimately
2182 For a discussion of the evidence supporting this claim, see supra notes 194-198 and
accompanying text.
283 The DPSA Working Party often relies on the rhetoric of fundamental rights to justify its views on
privacy issues and proper interpretation of the DP Directive. See, e.g., DPSA Working Party, Strategy
Document 4 (Sept. 29, 2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp98_en.pdf, DPSA Working Party,
Opinion 10/2001 on the Need for a Balanced Approach in the Fight Against Terrorism 3-3 (Dec. 14,
2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/200 l/wp53en.pdf, DPSA
Working Party, Recommendation 4/99 on the Inclusion of the Fundamental Right to Data Protection in
the European Catalogue of Fundamental Rights 3 (Sept. 7, 1999), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp26en.pdf Thus, it would be standard
practice to cite fundamental rights to justify the Directive's reliance on the market-corrective model, and
examining this rhetorical move is not discussing a straw man.2" See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary. Thus, the rhetorical strategy of invoking a fundamental right in order to
cut off further debate also tends to mask the impossibility of further useful debate.286
The second rhetorical purpose of the moral fiction that there is a fundamental
right to privacy is political in the Weberian sense that it justifies and rationalizes, or
at least seeks to justify and rationalize, relationships of power and control based on
the threat of force.287 Specifically, the claim that there is a fundamental right to
privacy serves to rationalize and justify the expansion of bureaucratic control over
individual and organizational behavior. Because there is a fundamental right to
privacy, there must be a DP Directive that embodies the right and a DPSA to apply
the Directive to individuals and organizations, with the accompanying threat of force
to bring the recalcitrant into compliance. Among the recalcitrant to be threatened
are, of course, those individuals and organizations that do not assign a value to
privacy protection that is consistent with the value assigned by those who claim that
privacy protection is a fundamental right. It is important to note, moreover, that the
rhetoric of fundamental rights serves to justify the expansion of bureaucratic control
whether the rhetoric is used by a DPSA to defend its own role or by an individual to
call for greater protection of privacy. The unspoken implication is that without the
powerful, market-corrective DPSA established by the Directive, the individual's
presumed right would not be protected, and the privacy of the individual's PiH would
be threatened by others who presumably do not place the proper value on the
individual's privacy.
As one would expect in the culture of bureaucratic individualism, the rhetorical
assertion of a fundamental right to privacy reveals the symbiotic relationship
between individual and bureaucracy as well as the limits of that relationship. The
individual depends upon the bureaucracy to protect the P11 that constitutes his or her
identity as this individual and the bureaucracy justifies its existence and expanding
power by citing the need to protect individuals from themselves and others - and
ultimately from the chaos of Hobbes's "warre . . . of every man, against every
man. 288 A person can remain outside the symbiotic relationship between individual
and bureaucracy only when and insofar as the person holds and uses P11 within the
purely personal space that lies beyond the scope of the Directive and, by implication,
the post-Enlightenment paradigm. Qua participant in the purely personal space, I
2' This argument does not entail, and is not intended to entail, the conclusion that those who make
claims about the fundamental right to privacy are intentionally propagating moral fictions or intentionally
masking arbitrary preferences. Indeed, I suspect that many if not most of the people who make claims
about the fundamental right to privacy do not have a hidden agenda. I also suspect, however, that if
drawn into a serious moral dispute about fundamental convictions, many of these same people would fall
back on a version of the argument that all moral precepts reflect the private values of the individuals who
hold those precepts and that those precepts therefore lie irretrievably beyond rational debate. How those
same people would square the latter position on the foundation of moral precepts with their former
convictions about the existence and binding character of fundamental rights is beyond the scope of this
Article. One might speculate, however, that the sheer ubiquity and vehemence of the rhetoric of
fundamental rights may help to obscure the absence of a sound moral foundation for that rhetoric from of
those who use it.
287 For Weber, "[a] 'ruling organization' will be called 'political' insofar as its existence and order is
continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on
the part of the administrative staff." WEBER, supra note 246, at 54 (emphasis in original).2
m See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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apparently do not pose a Hobbesian threat to myself or others, perhaps because I am
not viewed simply as an individual pursuing arbitrary personal preferences. 289 My
needs and actions therefore cannot be cited to justify expanding the power of
bureaucracy. Again, it appears that a different paradigm may be needed to account
for our situation within the purely personal space demarcated by the Directive.
As discussed above,29° one of the key characteristics of the bureaucracy for
Weber is the expectation that bureaucrats will deal with official business in an expert
and depersonalized manner. This means that a DPSA official, i.e., a bureaucrat
within the DPSA, would be expected to develop expertise on issues related to
collection and use of P11 and on the application of national laws implementing the
DP Directive. The official would be expected to approach his or her official
business impersonally, i.e., without regard to his or her own personal characteristics
or P11. As Dean Kronman wrote, summarizing Weber, "[i]mpersonal rule ... means
that the bureaucrat's personal affairs-his own interests and feelings-must be
excluded, insofar as is humanly possible, from the performance of his official duties
.. ,,29 In addition to disregarding his or her own P11, the official would be
expected to examine the PIH of regulated parties impersonally as a commodity
subject to regulatory control and thus ensure that the P11 itself--e.g., an individual's
wealth or race or nationality-has no impact on the outcome of regulatory action.
The bureaucrat's ability to act as an impersonal expert is one of the primary
justifications typically offered under the post-Enlightenment paradigm for granting
to public bureaucracies the vital role of imposing order on a world of individuals
pursuing personal preferences. In Maclntyre's words, "the major justification
advanced for the intervention of government in society is the contention that
government has resources of competence which most citizens do not possess." 292 He
adds: "Civil servants ... justify themselves and their claims to authority, power and
money by invoking their own competence as scientific managers of social
change.293  Developing Maclntyre's point, I would argue that the impersonal
expertise of the bureaucrat provides, or is thought to provide, a guarantee that the
bureaucrat will not take sides in the conflicts between the values of the individuals
and organizations that the bureaucrat regulates. In place of a shared vision of the
good, the impersonal public official offers the promise of a neutral expert charting a
path through the terrain of conflicting individual values along a line supposedly
dictated by, in Weber's words, "calculable rules and 'without regard for
persons.', 294 In the field of privacy protection, the DPSA official is an impersonal,
neutral expert applying calculable rules based on national law implementing the DP
289 See supra notes 189-92, 239-242 and accompanying text.
2WSee supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text. The claim that bureaucrats are expected to
meet certain expectations and thus embody a model of bureaucratic conduct does not mean that any actual
bureaucrat succeeds in meeting the standards or embodying the model. These comments about
impersonal expertise relate to the ideal type of the bureaucrat. For a discussion of"ideal types," see, e.g.,
GIDDENS, supra note 248, at 141-43; Parsons, supra note 244, at 12-13.
291 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 65 (1983), quoting Max Weber, supra note 246, at 225.
292 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 85.
293 Id. at 86.
294See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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Directive. Standing outside of and above the world of conflicting individual values,
including privacy preferences, the DPSA official exercises power over individuals
and organizations to prevent chaos and ensure that the outcomes of trading in the PHI
market are acceptable.
The importance of impersonality in this account of the bureaucrat points to a
paradox in the rationale for administrative protection of personal privacy and PH1
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm. By invoking the fundamental right to
privacy, the DP Directive signals the great significance to the individual of PIH and
its protection, whether a particular individual appreciates that significance or not.
Presumably one reason why my PHI is significant is that it tells me and others who I
am and it distinguishes me from all other individuals as this particular individual. In
this sense, it is a substantial component of my personal identity.295 In order to
protect my P11 and the related personal identity, however, the post-Enlightenment
paradigm presumes and requires intervention and control by a radically impersonal
character or persona, the expert DPSA official. Thus, paradoxically, the existence
and activity of the impersonal bureaucrat is understood to be a necessary condition
of the protection and preservation of PiH and personal identity. In other words, under
the post-Enlightenment paradigm, protecting the individual's personal identity in the
market from threats by other individuals and organizations presupposes cancelling or
bracketing out the public official's personal identity. My personal identity can be
secure only under the supervision of someone who, qua public official, eschews his
or her personal identity and ignores mine.
The paradoxical relationship of impersonal bureaucrat to personal identity
points to another paradox in the DP Directive's treatment of the impersonal
bureaucrat himself or herself. If the demand for privacy protection is understood as
a demand for, among other things, greater bureaucratic authority over collection and
use of Pli, then it follows that growing concerns about privacy are likely to be met
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm with expanding government power. By
purporting to regulate government collection and use of P11, 296 however, the DP
Directive itself acknowledges that government bureaucracies pose a significant
threat to personal privacy. This suggests that each increase in the power of DPSA
officials to protect privacy also may enhance the power of those officials to invade
privacy. Indeed, the Directive formalizes this power to threaten privacy by explicitly
granting DPSA officials seemingly unlimited authority to scrutinize P1|.297 The
Directive apparently acknowledges the seriousness of the threat to privacy that it
creates and seeks to neutralize the threat by placing DPSA officials under the seal of
confidentiality.298 Thus, the DPSA official embodies a paradox: unlimited power to
invade individual privacy that is at the same time sufficient protection of individual
privacy. Without this equation of privacy invasion and privacy protection, the
DPSA official could not function as the impersonal expert bureaucrat whose activity
is necessary to protect the individual's PI and personal identity.
295 See supra p. 43-45.
296 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.298 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Underlining the paradoxical nature of the DPSA official, it should be recalled
that the DP Directive recognizes another sphere in which unlimited power to invade
privacy apparently is at the same time sufficient protection of privacy.299 P11 held in
the purely personal space is not subject to the Directive or, apparently, the
fundamental right to information privacy. Within the purely personal space, a
person such as a wife or boyfriend may collect and use P11 about another person and
yet apparently not pose any threat to the other's privacy. This means that a DPSA
official who scrutinizes P11 but does not threaten privacy is expected to respect
everyone's PII in a way that is eerily similar to the way in which my hypothetical
boyfriend is expected to respect my P11. Of course, the hypothetical boyfriend is not
under a legal obligation to keep my PI confidential. But the need to impose such an
obligation on the DPSA official reveals the extraordinary level of power and trust
that the Directive reposes in the DPSA official, power and trust required to receive
unlimited access to P11. As indicated above, °° it is difficult to account for this kind
of trust in the purely personal space using the analytical tools of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm-i.e., individuals pursuing private preferences according to
personal values in a market overseen by impersonal bureaucrats. To account for the
character of the boyfriend or the bureaucrat in a manner that justifies reposing trust
in either may require reference to a different paradigm.3 ' Again, I will simply
suggest that the old Aristotelian paradigm, with its emphasis on the virtues and
characters of persons in relationships with one another, might provide a useful
starting point.
V. THE PRIVACY DEBATE AS FAMILY FEUD
This Article began with the observation that critics of the U.S. internet privacy
regime often point to the EU regime as a possible model for law reform in the United
States. It is not surprising that scholars might take this position, °2 since an
international orientation coupled with an attack on U.S. legal arrangements may lead
to publication and academic success. Indeed, criticism of the U.S. regime in light of
the EU model has now become sufficiently commonplace that one finds it in law
school casebooks. For example, Professors Mann and Winn observe that the
OECD's Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
299 See supra notes 182-192 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the DP
Directive's exclusion of the purely personal space).
"' See supra pp. 36-37.
"" See supra p. 37.
32 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Myers, Note, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An
Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 109, 113 (1997) (United States should adopt legislation conforming to EU law); Rachel
K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the "Cookies" Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 460, 462-63 (2000-0001) (United States
should adopt EU data protection principles and seek EU help in formulating new legislation). See also
Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal Data
Protection: A European Perspective, 22 FORDIIAM INT'L L. J. 2024, 2049 (1999) ("fragmentation of U.S.
data protection responsibilities is likely to become increasingly apparent as the EU directive becomes
operational and appropriate institutional arrangements in the United States would seem essential, both to
defend its business interests and to resolve potential political friction between the Union and the United
States").
20071
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
Personal Data "serve as a source of inspiration for the EU data-protection law,"
while "the United States has not forced its businesses to comply with the
Guidelines.',30 3 In a similar vein, Professors Ku and Lipton have written that "[in
contrast [to the United States], other nations, and most notably, the European Union
have taken more aggressive steps to protect individual privacy in data collection."
3 °4
In addition to such scholarly criticism of the U.S. regime from an EU perspective,
policymakers and others have strongly suggested that the U.S. regime is not
"adequate ' 30 5 from the standpoint of the EU rules restricting exports of PH1 and
should therefore be reformed to facilitate such exports.3°
For purposes of this Article, the details of the debates about the relative merits
of the U.S. and EU regimes are not particularly important. What matters is that by
positing the regimes as alternatives, emphasizing the differences between them, and
attacking one from the perspective of the other, these debates tend to obscure what
the two regimes have in common. As this Article and its predecessor on the U.S.
regime have argued, both regimes reflect and reinforce the post-Enlightenment
paradigm. Both regimes presume a world consisting of individuals trading their PH1
in a market as a commodity for a price and both regimes reinforce that world by
purporting to protect those individuals and ensure the proper operation of that
market. Both regimes presume that individuals will interact with private
bureaucratic organizations in the market. Both regimes facilitate and encourage such
interactions by subjecting them to regulatory oversight. Both regimes presuppose
that the market will not function properly without some degree of public
bureaucratic supervision--relatively limited policing supervision under the U.S.
regime and relatively more comprehensive market-corrective supervision under the
EU regime. Both regimes respond to this presumed need for bureaucratic
supervision by purporting to provide the type of supervision supposedly required. In
all of these respects, debate over the relative merits of the U.S. and EU information
privacy regimes is a family feud because both regimes unmistakably reflect and
reinforce the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Regardless of differences in detail, arguments favoring the U.S. or the EU
approach to information privacy on the internet reflect and reinforce the post-
Enlightenment paradigm in another important way. As Maclntyre has suggested, in
the culture of bureaucratic individualism, political debate typically centers around
the merits of extending bureaucratic control. 0 7
[T]he contending parties agree ...that there are only two alternative
modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices
of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is
303 MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 209.
o RAYMOND S. R. Ku & JACQUELINE D. LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW 544 (2d ed. 2006)
305 See supra note 118 and accompanying text; Kightlinger, supra note 49, at 10-08.
306 MANN & WINN, supra note 3, at 215. See Mike Ewing, Comment, The Perfect Storm: The Safe
Harbor and the Directive on Data Protection, 24 HOus. J. INT'L L. 315, 336 (2002) (EU pressured United
States to adopt the "Directive or its own comprehensive data protection scheme"); Gregory Schaffer,
Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratchetng Up of
U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INTL L. I, 6 (2000) ("EU policy and practice places pressure on U.S.
regulators and businesses to adapt U.S. data privacy policy and practice").307 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of
individuals.
308
To illustrate Macintyre's point, I have shown elsewhere that a recent political
debate in the United States about the freedom of children to use the internet without
risks to information privacy resulted in, among other things, an extension of the
FTC's authority over children's P1. 309 What began as a debate about protecting
individual freedom ended by, among other things, enhancing bureaucratic control.
Similarly, any debate over the relative merits of the U.S. and EU approaches to
information privacy inevitably will oscillate between these same poles, favoring
some version of the U.S. approach, which emphasizes the sovereignty of the free
individual in the market, or some version of the EU approach, which emphasizes
bureaucratic control over the market, or some hybrid of the two approaches.31 0
Thus, what initially seemed like a novel debate about information privacy in the new
electronic media simply reprises a long-standing debate or antinomy-individual v.
bureaucracy-rooted in the collapse of the old teleological paradigm and the rise of
bureaucratic individualism under the new post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Alfred North Whitehead once wrote, presumably with some irony, that
"[flamiliar things happen, and mankind does not bother about them. It takes a very
unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious." 31 Whitehead's comment
seems particularly apposite to comparisons between the U.S. and EU internet privacy
regimes. There is something strangely obvious and familiar about the elements that
the two regimes have in common, i.e., individuals, markets, bureaucracies, and there
is something obvious and familiar about a debate pitting the more individualist U.S.
approach against the more bureaucratic or "statist" EU approach. The role of the
post-Enlightenment paradigm as a conceptual foundation for both regimes and for
the debate between them helps to explain the pervasive sense of obviousness and
familiarity. If, as has been argued in this Article and its predecessor, the post-
Enlightenment paradigm guides and structures the way that we ordinarily think
about ourselves and our institutional world, then we would find it obvious and
familiar that the U.S. and EU regimes take the forms that they do and that debates
about online privacy oscillate between these two poles. Indeed, we would find it
very difficult to imagine the regimes looking otherwise or the debate taking any
other form. This simply is the way our political life now looks and, as Maclntyre
suggests, this is the way debate about political issues unfolds. In this respect, the
foundational presence of the post-Enlightenment paradigm may help to explain the
obviousness of the obvious and the familiarity of the familiar. And this strong
feeling of obviousness and familiarity lends support to the contention that the post-
Enlightenment paradigm is our paradigm.
No doubt proponents of one or the other internet privacy regime would find this
discussion simplistic and misleading because it deflects attention from what they
3  
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 12, at 35.
3"' Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 389 (discussing Congress's adoption of COPPA).
3 " For an interesting example of a hybrid approach, see Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1679-81 (calling
for, among other things, establishment ofa U.S. Data Protection Commission modeled after the national
data protection agency in Canada or the DPSA in Germany).
31 ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 4 (1953).
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would say is the real and important issue. They would point out that despite the
structural similarities between the two regimes, there are real differences, and those
differences present us with a policy choice: which regime should we adopt and
why? Our real and important task is to reason and debate our way to the correct
choice, and not to spin our wheels discussing paradigms. The difficulty with this
way of characterizing our situation-i.e., as people who must engage in a process of
reasoned policy choice-is that it invites a further swing of the post-Enlightenment
hammer. If the Enlightenment critique of earlier teleological schemes was correct,
then we no longer have available to us a true account of the human good or telos. If
the subsequent critique of Enlightenment thought is correct, then we also do not have
available to us an adequate substitute for the earlier teleological schemes, a substitute
that provides adequate reasons for embracing the list(s) of moral and ethical precepts
by which each of us ordinarily lives. Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, those
precepts are now understood to reflect our private, subjective values, and not a true
account of who we are and who we should become. The precepts are understood to
display, in Macintyre's phrase, arbitrary preferences. Thus, in attempting to perform
the "real and important task" of reasoned policy choice, one may be able to
demonstrate that commitment to a particular internet privacy regime, to an
individualist approach or a bureaucratic approach, is consistent with, and perhaps
follows logically from, a particular set of moral and ethical precepts. But under the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, this demonstration also appears to prove that
commitment to a particular approach to internet privacy is ultimately rooted in an
individual's private values and arbitrary preferences.
If a reasoned policy choice between competing approaches to internet privacy
will reflect nothing more than the arbitrary preferences of the person doing the
choosing, then at bottom, the choice will be arbitrary. My choice will, of course, not
seem arbitrary to me, because it will reflect my preferences, and my preferences do
not seem arbitrary to me. My preferences catalogue what matters to me, and surely
what matters to me cannot be arbitrary. But this attempt to explain and justify my
policy choice by reference to my preferences begs the question why my preferences
matter, or should matter, to me or anyone else. Under the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, my preferences appear to be a fact about me from which no value, no
"ought" statement, can be inferred.31 2 So a process of reasoned policy choice may
show me the logical implications of what are in fact my preferences in the field of
information privacy, but that process cannot show me or anyone what I ought to
prefer and why. Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, my preferences and values
simply are what they are. Thus, focusing on the foundational role of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm in the EU and U.S. internet privacy regimes does not
simply deflect us from the real and important task of reasoned policy choice. It
actually may encourage us to depose, or at least challenge, such idols of
Enlightenment faith as the very possibility of reasoned policy choices. We may have
to recognize that reasoned policy choice is another moral fiction masking arbitrary
preferences. This line of argument clearly raises a host of serious questions
discussion of which must be deferred to a later publication. One thing should,
however, be clear. We cannot simply presume that making a policy choice between
312 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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the two competing approaches to internet privacy is our real and important task.
Indeed, we cannot presume that we are even capable of answering the moral/ethical
question which of our tasks is or are real and important, because this question will
pose a central problem in any discussion of the post-Enlightenment paradigm and its
implications.
This argument regarding the foundational role of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm is not intended to imply that there will in fact be no resolution to the
debate over the relative merits of the EU and U.S. internet privacy regimes. Rather,
it is intended to suggest that under the paradigm any proposed resolution will reflect
only the arbitrary preferences of those who favor that resolution and will make no
claim, reasoned or otherwise, on those who do not share such preferences. Any
"victory" for one or the other proposed resolution will reflect only the arbitrary
balance of forces supporting competing arbitrary personal preferences. To pursue
the analogy suggested above, if the debate over the relative merits of the U.S. and
EU approaches to information-privacy protection is a kind of family feud, then the
family itself is fundamentally dysfunctional because the feud cannot be definitively
settled under the post-Enlightenment paradigm without resort to force. The feud is
interminable, and it will demonstrate its interminability by reappearing time and
again. Any "resolution" to the feud will last only as long as the victors remain in the
ascendancy.
The EU's export-control regime for P11 nicely illustrates the role of political and
economic force in the "debate" over competing approaches to protecting P11. The
DP Directive tightly restricts exports of P11 to countries that lack "adequate" privacy
protection31 3 and requires the European Commission to "enter into negotiations"
with such countries "with a view to remedying the situation. 31 4  In effect, the
Directive threatens to "embargo" P11 exports to countries that refuse to play ball,3 5
thereby forcing such countries to revise their national laws and then ask DPSA and
EU officials to bless the result. Thus, as one would expect under the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, European bureaucrats may settle the "debate" in most
countries over the merits of competing approaches to information privacy by
wielding thinly disguised economic force in favor of the more bureaucratic EU
approach.3t 6  That we continue to refer to this international process as a
"negotiation" and the ensuing domestic political affray as a "debate" demonstrates
again our susceptibility to moral fictions.
313
See supra Part III.B.3.
34 See DP Directive, supra note 42, art. 25.5.
3 See id. art. 25.4. 1 owe the term "embargo" to Paul Schwartz. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at
488-95 (discussing the possibility that data protection officials might embargo data exports to countries
lacking adequate protection).3
16 The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement, see supra note 116, illustrates what can happen in
negotiations over PII exports and national law reform when an irresistible bureaucratic force from the EU
meets an immoveable bureaucratic object such as the U.S. Department of Commerce backed by U.S.
industry. The resolution of the "debate" reflects the balance of forces.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began with an outline of the origins of what I have labeled the
"post-Enlightenment paradigm," a notion that I derived from the philosophical work
of Alasdair Macintyre. The Article then discussed the EU's information-privacy
regime in some detail and sought to show that the regime reflects and reinforces the
post-Enlightenment paradigm. The regime reflects the paradigm because the regime
is constructed around the paradigm's key elements: individuals, markets, and
bureaucracies. It reinforces the paradigm because it provides legal support for those
elements. The regime abstracts people from "purely personal" relationships and
deals with them as individuals; it treats interactions between and among individuals
and organizations as market interactions in which each party exchanges items of
value, including Pil, for a price; and it imposes bureaucratic supervision on
individuals, organizations, and their interactions. Moreover, the information-privacy
regime reflects and reinforces the paradigm in a field of supposedly intimate
significance to people and their personal identities, i.e., collection and use of Pit.
Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes of a world organized around the post-
Enlightenment paradigm that the "obvious" response to concerns about threats to our
intimate, personal lives is expanding the power of an impersonal, expert
bureaucracy-in this instance the DPSAs in the EU Member States.
Drawing on my conclusions in a previous study, this Article also has sought to
show that the U.S. and EU internet privacy regimes have a common structure rooted
in the post-Enlightenment paradigm. This strongly suggests that debates about the
relative merits of the two regimes, regardless of differences in detail, will also
strengthen the hold of the paradigm. Under the paradigm, we find ourselves living
in the culture of bureaucratic individualism, and debates about public policy issues
predictably become debates about which side of the dyad, individual or bureaucracy,
to emphasize at any given time. The U.S. internet privacy regime emphasizes the
former, the EU regime the latter, and together they appear to define our principal
options. If, as I have suggested, the post-Enlightenment paradigm is our normal and
ordinary way of explaining and justifying human action, then it is not surprising that
the options presented by the paradigm-individual or bureaucracy-might appear to
be the primary, if not the only options available to us. Indeed, it would not be
surprising if these options and the debate they engender would come to seem
obvious and familiar, precisely because the paradigm limits our ability to imagine
and articulate plausible alternatives.
This Article's conclusions concerning the role of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm in shaping and structuring our thinking should be regarded as provisional.
It is one thing to find operating in the U.S. and EU internet-privacy regimes certain
philosophical presumptions that emerged from the wreckage of Enlightenment
thought and quite another to conclude that those presumptions constitute a paradigm
that shapes and structures the way that we think. In a projected study of early U.S.
Supreme Court decisions examining and defining the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, I expect to provide further evidence of the role that the
post-Enlightenment paradigm plays in shaping reflection on policy issues. A
working hypothesis of that study will be that one can identify in the Court's
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reasoning clear evidence of the paradigm's emergence as a distinctive explanation
and justification of human action in the rapidly industrializing Nineteenth Century
United States. A broader methodological goal of the projected study will be to
demonstrate that the post-Enlightenment paradigm provides a useful heuristic device
for reassessing the significance of seemingly familiar legal developments and
institutions far afield from information privacy, and relating those legal
developments and institutions to broader historical and philosophical trends
discussed in Maclntyre's work.
Assuming it is possible to demonstrate through a series of studies the pervasive
impact of the post-Enlightenment paradigm on the way that we explain and justify
human action in the fields of law and administration, there nevertheless will remain
an arguably more basic question: is there an alternative to the post-Enlightenment
paradigm? Identifying a paradigm and tracing its influence is not the same as
escaping or transcending a paradigm. 3 7 As noted above,3 18 to escape from the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, one presumably would have to pursue one of two
approaches. One approach would be to assist in the revival of the pre-Enlightenment
teleological account of human nature and moral life, building on the moral and
political philosophy of Aristotle. By way of illustration, this Article has noted at
several points problems or questions that arise under the DP Directive and the post-
Enlightenment paradigm that the old Aristotelian paradigm might help us to address
and perhaps resolve.3 19 Revitalizing the old paradigm has been a key thrust of
Maclntyre's work over the last twenty years.320  In future articles, I expect to
examine and pursue Maclntyre's endeavors in this direction, focusing on his
discussions of natural law and questioning the usefulness of his effort to defend a
Christian and Thomist interpretation of Aristotle.32 '
Instead of attempting to breathe life into a moldering Aristotle, an alternative
approach would be to accept as decisive the Enlightenment's critique of the older
teleological framework and attempt to construct a new rational basis or intellectual
support structure for our moral/ethical and political/legal commitments. Latter-day
Kantians, utilitarians, and others might be viewed as engaging in this task. For
reasons summarized by Maclntyre, however, I am much less sanguine about this
approach:
[Tihe great Enlightenment theorists had themselves disagreed both
morally and philosophically. Their heirs have, through brilliant and
sophisticated feats of argumentation, made it evident that if these
disagreements are not interminable, they are such at least that after two
hundred years no prospect of termination is in sight. Succeeding
317 Kightlinger, supra note 7, at 354-55.
31" See supra note 211.
3 'See supra pp. 35-36 and note 242 and accompanying text. See also supra pp. 61-62.
320 For a brief and accessible defense of Aristotelian moral theory, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Plain
Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, in THE MACI NTYRE READER 136 (Kelvin
Knight ed., 1998).
321 MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS, supra note 12, at 170-215 (arguing that the Aristotelian-
Thomist emphasis on traditions of moral enquiry may help to identify and possibly resolve problems in
competing moral frameworks).
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generations of Kantians, utilitarians, natural rights' theorists, and
contractarians show no sign of genuine convergence. 
22
I would be pleased to see progress toward such a convergence or a persuasive
explanation of why convergence is not possible or desirable. As matters stand,
however, perpetual disagreement among the main modem schools of moral
philosophy tends to bolster the post-Enlightenment paradigm by lending credibility
to the thesis that our conflicting moral beliefs necessarily reflect nothing more than
the private, ultimately arbitrary preferences or values of the particular believer-
even if that believer bears the title Professor of Philosophy and can fashion his or her
beliefs into a book-length argument. My working hypothesis would be that Aristotle
can provide a way out of the impasse of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment
moral philosophy and that his work therefore may still provide the basis for a
persuasive alternative to the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
322 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered, in ETHICS AND POLITICS
172, 181-82 (2006). Maclntyre has argued persuasively that there is still a great deal to be learned from
utilitarian and Kantian approaches to moral philosophy, even if those approaches ultimately leave
fundamental questions unanswered. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and Lies: What is the
Problem and What Can We Learn from Mill?, in ETHICS AND POLITICS 101-21 (2006) (drawing insights
from Mill's utilitarianism); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and Lies: What Can We Learn from
Kant?, in ETHICS AND POLITICS 122-42 (2006) (drawing insights from Kant's moral philosophy).
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